Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis by Holland, H. Brian
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
11-2010 
Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis 
H. Brian Holland 
Texas A&M University School of Law, hbholland@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
H. B. Holland, Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 335 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/110 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
Volume 24, Number 2 Spring 2011
SOCIAL SEMIOTICS IN THE FAIR USE ANALYSIS
H. Brian Holland*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. ...... 336
II. SITUATING TRANSFORMATIVENESS IN THE FAIR USE
ANALYSIS. ................................... .......... 338
A. The Fair Use Defense ............................. 339
B. The Emergence of Transformativeness ............ ..... 342
III. SOCIAL SEMIOTICS AND TRANSFORMATIVE USE.......................348
A. Prevailing Conceptions of Transformativeness and
Authorial Presence ........................ ...... 349
B. Imbalances Between Monopoly Incentive and
Accommodation ......................... ....... 354
C. An Alternate Conception of Transformativeness ..... ..... 359
1. Meaning as Social Value.........................359
2. Transformativeness as a Social Semiotic Process ................ 363
3. Example: Fairey v. Associated Press ................. 367
A. The Work. ................................... 369
B. Semiotic Resources Represented in the Work...................370
C. Motivations of the Sign-Maker ............. ...... 373
D. Discourse, Negotiation, and Interpretive
Communities ............................ 374
E. Social Convention and Power............ .............. 379
F. The Transformativeness Inquiry............ ...... 380
IV. SOCIAL SEMIOTICS AND THE REMAINING FAIR USE
FACTORS .................................................... 382
A. Nature of the Copyrighted Work .......................... 383
B. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used................385
C. Effect on Actual and Potential Markets ......... ........... 386
V. CONCLUSION. ........................................ ...... 390
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan School of Law. I would like to express my appre-
ciation to participants at the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Berkeley
School of Law, the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable at Drake University
School of Law, the 2010 Southwest Junior Scholars Conference at Arizona State Univer-
sity's Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, and the Annual Conference of the Central
States Law School Association at Capital Law School. I am particularly indebted to Profes-
sor Laura Heymann for her valuable comments. Thank you also to Rebecca Croes, Abby
Kweller, and Stevenson Moore, for providing excellent research assistance and support.
Finally, thank you Sarah, Will, and Ella, for the most important things.
336 Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology [Vol. 24
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, artist Shepard Fairey created the now-iconic "Hope"
poster,I a closely cropped image of presidential candidate Barack
Obama, composed in geometric forms of red, white, and blue. The
Hope poster was wildly popular with Obama supporters, selling thou-
sands of copies. 2 Proceeds from these sales were used to produce
thousands more posters, which were given away for free.3 After
Obama's election, the original work was acquired by the Smithsonian
Institution's National Portrait Gallery for its permanent collection.4
The Hope poster was created using a reference photograph of
Obama.5 In 2009, The Associated Press ("The AP") claimed copyright
ownership of that photograph and sought to obtain licensing fees and
royalty revenues from Fairey for its use. Those initial efforts failed
and ultimately led to litigation.7 The AP claimed copyright infringe-
ment, and Fairey raised a fair use defense. At the heart of that de-
fense is the issue of transformativeness, a key factor in those
infringement cases in which protected works are used as raw material
for the creation of subsequent works. Copyright doctrine accommo-
dates transformative new works because, rather than merely supersed-
ing the original work, the subsequent work alters the original with
new "expression, meaning, or message." 9 Evaluation of a new work's
transformative value traditionally requires an examination of the new
work and the transforming artist's process of creation for evidence of
authorial purpose, process, and activity. 10 As with many postmodern
pieces, however, the traditional transformativeness analysis does not
favor Fairey's Obama posters. Copyright law- stubbornly clinging
to romantic ideals of authorship and originality as the exclusive
grounds for protection- appears unable to acknowledge the social
value of Fairey's work.
In this case, evidence of the Obama posters' social value is all
around us. The Hope poster was not only popular with Obama sup-
1. The "Hope" poster was one of several similarly themed works created by Fairey in
support of Obama's candidacy for President of the United States. Complaint at 1, Fairey v.
Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Complaint]. The
Obama campaign "encouraged" but was not initially involved in the creation of these works,
although it later embraced Fairey's efforts. Id. at 3.
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id.
4. Dave Itzkoff, National Portrait Gallery Gets Obaina Poster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 2009, at C2, available at http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/national-portrait-
gallery-gets-obama-poster.
5. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 7.
6. Id. at 1, 9.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1, 10-11.
9. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
10. See infra Part II.
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porters, it was also a lightning rod for his detractors. As discussed in
Part III.C.3, Fairey intended the image to convey a message of idealis-
tic leadership potential, and for most supporters this was precisely the
meaning derived. But for other, differently situated audiences, the
meaning of the work was quite different. These various interpretive
communities engaged the Hope poster as a symbol of socialism,
communism, religious idolatry, anti-Americanism, and elitism. In es-
sence, the effect of this single work was to cultivate multiple mean-
ings, each of which can be seen as a new form of expression. The
transformative nature of the poster is evidenced in mash-ups produced
by Obama supporters, who took Fairey's intended message and made
it their own, producing both pro-Obama and anti-McCain or anti-Palin
derivatives. Obama detractors did the same, alternating both image
and text to produce mash-ups that reflected their own interpretations
of Fairey's work. This is precisely the transformative effect that
should be accommodated through the fair use doctrine. Under conven-
tional fair use analysis, however, these dramatic transformative effects
are nearly irrelevant.
Fair use is perhaps the most contested doctrine in all of copyright
law. New technologies that not only enable increased audience en-
gagement with cultural works, but also facilitate the use of these "raw
materials" to produce new works have made fair use more controver-
sial.12 At another level, these technologies have made visible an audi-
ence, not of passive content consumers, but of active participants in
discourse around and about those works.
This Article presents an argument for an expansion of fair use
based on social semiotic theory, rather than on theories of authorship
or rights of autonomy of subsequent authors. Instead, it employs a
theory of the audience linked to social practice. The Article asks, in
essence, whether audiences determine the meaning, purpose, function,
or social benefit of an allegedly infringing work, often independent of
the creator's intent. If so, does it matter for the purpose of a fair use
analysis based on a claim of transformativeness?
Part II sets the doctrinal groundwork for an exploration of social
semiotic theory in the fair use inquiry. It focuses on transformative-
ness, a concept at the heart of the fair use analysis of the purpose and
character of a defendant's use of a copyrighted work. Transformative-
11. See, e.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per cu-
riam) (containing the oft-cited statement that "the issue of fair use ... is the most trouble-
some in the whole law of copyright," generally credited to Judge Learned Hand).
12. See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto
for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 930-55 (2009) (discussing
the copyright problems associated with appropriation and remix); Gideon Parchomovsky &
Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REv. 1483, 1491 (2007) (noting the
prevalence of user-produced content and the importance of remix as a mode of production
as requiring reform of fair use).
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ness recognizes the value of new works created using protected works
as raw material, where those subsequent works constitute new expres-
sion, meaning, or message, and accommodates these works within the
limitations of existing expressive monopolies.
Part III explores the prevailing conception of transformativeness
and proposes an alternative conception. In practice, the transforma-
tiveness inquiry focuses on whether the defendant engaged in author-
ial purpose or activity. This focus on authorship, rather than the
resulting work, emphasizes monopoly rights-based incentives to cre-
ate new works at the expense of accommodating new works that use
protected works as raw materials. This imbalance in the equilibrium
between monopoly incentive and accommodation means that the full
social benefit of additional expression is not realized. Social semiotics
offers an alternate conception of transformativeness in which social
value is manifest in the process of meaning-making that occurs as
individuals and interpretive communities engage the work. Copy-
right's commitment to the enrichment of society can be best evaluated
in the context of this process of semiosis as a distinct question apart
from the creation of new authorial rights. Finally, the case of Fairey v.
Associated Press is used to illustrate how social semiotic theories are
applied.13
Part IV looks at how social semiotic theory might be relevant in
an analysis of the remaining fair use factors: the nature of the copy-
righted work, the amount and substantiality used, and the effect on
actual and potential markets. This Article concludes that social semi-
otics is most helpful in terms of the nature of the copyrighted work,
with only limited application to the remaining factors. Part V con-
cludes.
II. SITUATING TRANSFORMATIVENESS IN THE FAIR USE
ANALYSIS
The starting point for a fair use analysis is a defendant's alleged
infringement of a copyright holder's exclusive rights attendant to an
original work, usually through the reproduction of the original or the
13. In January 2011, Fairey v. Associated Press was settled prior to a decision on the
merits. Press Release, The Associated Press, AP and Shepard Fairey Announce Agreement
in Obama Poster Case, Jan. 12, 2011, available at http://www.ap.org/pages/about/
pressreleases/pr_011211a.html. In March 2011, The AP settled its claims against Obey
Clothing, the exclusive licensee of Shepard Fairey. Press Release, The Associated Press,
The Associated Press and Obey Clothing Settle Copyright Infringement Suit March 16,
2011, available at http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr 031611b.html. Also in
March 2011, the AP filed suit against clothing retailers Urban Outfitters and Nordstmm,
among others, for selling apparel adorning with the Fairey image; these suits remain active
as of publication. Press Release, The Associated Press, AP Sues Clothing Retailers over
'HOPE' Image, March 11, 2011, available at http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/
wn 031111a.html.
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creation of a derivative work without the authorization of the copy-
right holder. Fair use is thus an affirmative defense to the infringe-
ment charge.14 This Part of the Article both sets out the substance of
the fair use analysis and explores the emergence of transformativeness
as a central question in that inquiry.
A. The Fair Use Defense
Most scholars agree that fair use first appeared in American law
as a common law concept, grounded in two mid-nineteenth century
opinions by Justice Story.15 The first, Gray v. Russell, discussed in
dicta the difficulty of determining whether infringement of a protected
work might be excused where the subsequent work is in the form of a
criticism or abridgement of the original.16 This opinion was followed
two years later by Folsom v. Marsh, in which Justice Story addressed
and rejected defendants' affirmative assertion of fair use.17 "[T]he real
hinge of the whole controversy" was, Story observed, whether "the
defendants had a right to abridge and select, and use the materials
which they have taken for their work, which, though it embraces [a
significant amount of the original work], is an original and new
work."18 The defendants sought to justify their significant use of the
original works by arguing that "only such materials . .. as suited [the
14. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (stating that "fair use
is an affirmative defense"). But see WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:1.50
(2011) ("'Limitations and exceptions to copyright,' a phrase much in current use, posits the
issue backwards . . . ."). According to Patry, before the statutory recognition of the doctrine,
fair use was used by courts "to ensure that the objectives of copyright. . . were not stifled by
copyright owners bent on shutting down all unauthorized uses or extracting license fees for
conduct that should be uncompensated." Id. Further, Patry calls fair use "an important safety
valve that acts as a bulwark against the monopoly power that inheres in an exclusive right
and which leads owners of such rights to act in ways contrary to the public interest." Id.; see
also Mary W. S. Wong, "Transformative" User-Generated Content in Copyright Law:
Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1109-10
(2009).
15. Early in its discussion of fair use, the Campbell Court turned to Justice Story to de-
scribe the importance of fair use:
For as Justice Story explained, "[i]n truth, in literature, in science and
in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract
sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in litera-
ture, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use
much which was well known and used before."
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (alteration in original) (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas.
615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)). It is also broadly acknowledged, however, that American
courts drew from English law in developing their common law doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 576
(referencing cases brought under England's Statute of Anne, particularly involving "fair
abridgements" of existing works).
16. 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839). See also WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
FAIR USE § 1:20 n.9 (2009) [hereinafter PATRY ON FAIR USE] (discussing the Gray v. Rus-
sell decision).
17. 9 F. Cas. 342, 347-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
18. Id. at 347.
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adapting author's] own limited purpose as a biographer" had been
selected. 19 Justice Story, although conceding this point and noting that
defendants had "produced an exceedingly valuable book," rejected
this assertion of contextual need as dispositive of the question:
It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion
of copyright, that the whole of a work should be cop-
ied, or even a large portion of it, in form or in sub-
stance. If so much is taken, that the value of the
original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially to an injurious ex-
tent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in
point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. . . . [It
does not] necessarily depend upon the quantity
taken .... It is often affected by other considera-
tions, [such as] the value of the materials taken, and
the importance of it to the sale of the original
work..... In short, we must often, in deciding ques-
tions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the
selections made, the quantity and value of the mate-
rials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or super-
sede the objects, of the original work.20
As conceived in Folsom, fair use turned both on quantitative and
qualitative distinctions between the original work and the allegedly
infringing work, and on associated market harms. Applying these
principles to the case at bar, the defense was rejected.2 1
19. Id. at 348.
20. Id.
21. Patry describes the application of these principles as follows:
Why did Upham lose? He had appropriated a mere 4.5% of the plain-
tiffs work, and had in the process produced an admittedly excellent
work the enjoining of which prevented its use by the intended audi-
ence of schoolchildren. Justice Story's decision was based on his
conclusion that Upham's use of the plaintiffs work was not the result
of a "fair exercise of a mental operation." That this failure is what
doomed Upham is established by the court's comment that this was
not a case where "abbreviated or select passages are taken from par-
ticular letters; but the entire letters are taken." Earlier, after remarking
on the necessity of a "real [and] substantial condensation," Justice
Story had condemned the "facile use of the scissors," which is appar-
ently what he thought defendant had done by copying entire letters.
PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 1:20 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at
345, 349).
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Fair use remained a common law doctrine until its codification in
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976:22
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.23
In substance, statutory fair use leans heavily on considerations identi-
fied in Folsom.24 The defense is framed by examples contained in the
preamble, focusing on socially beneficial works promoting critical
discourse, news, and education.25 These examples are followed by a
list of four non-exclusive factors26 to guide the resolution of a particu-
22. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-805 (2006). It is generally agreed that
"Section 107 is intended to restate the [common law] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
24. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (acknowledging the
connection). But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opin-
ions, 1978 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 560 (2008) (agreeing that the "language of sec-
tion 107's factors was largely drawn from" Folsom, but noting that it is "an opinion whose
influence on American fair use case law up to the 1976 Act we have probably overesti-
mated ... but whose influence since is quite clear").
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
26. Id. But see Beebe, supra note 24, at 563 (finding that in fact "judges rarely explicitly
considered factors beyond the four listed in section 107").
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lar case.27 There are no per se cases of fair use; rather, each factor
should be considered against the specific facts of an individual case.28
B. The Emergence of Transformativeness
Early Supreme Court cases applying Section 107 contained no
reference to the transformative nature of a work as a factor in the fair
use analysis. Instead, the Court tended to focus on the interplay be-
tween the commerciality aspect of factor one and the question of mar-
ket harm set forth in factor four. In Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.,29 the Court created what came to be known as "the Sony
presumption,"3 0 positing that "under factor one, a commercial 'pur-
pose' is presumptively unfair and a noncommercial purpose presump-
tively fair." Commercial use is treated as a "presumptively ...
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege" because it tends to in-
hibit the copyright holder's ability to capitalize on potential markets
and thus also inhibit the incentive to create.32 Noncommercial use is
comparatively less likely to have this effect, and thus carries no pre-
sumption of market harm, requiring instead a showing of either actual
harm or the likelihood of future harm caused by the challenged use.
27. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 ("[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doc-
trine in the statute.... [T]he courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situa-
tions on a case-by-case basis.").
28. See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir.
2009) ("Section 107 contemplates that the question of whether a given use of copyrighted
material is 'fair' requires a case-by-case analysis in which the statutory factors are not
'treated in isolation' but are 'weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."'
(quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578)); Jeannine M. Marques, Note, Fair Use in the 21st
Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 331, 335 (2007)
("Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact that can be determined at summary judgment
if no genuine issue of material fact exists."); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.").
29. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (relying primarily on the fourth fair use factor to hold that the
time-shifting of free broadcast television shows constituted fair use).
30. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386
(6th Cir. 1996) (discussing the continuing viability and substance of the "Sony presumption"
after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose); Stacey L. Dogan, Comment: Sony, Fair Use, and File Shar-
ing, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 971, 973-74 (2005) (discussing the applicability of "the Sony
presumption" to cases involving peer-to-peer file-sharing networks); Pamela Samuelson,
The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1831, 1870-71 (2006) (discussing application of "Sony's presump-
tion" in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992)).
31. Beebe, supra note 24, at 599; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 (observing that "[i]f the
Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use
would presumptively be unfair," but "[t]he contrary presumption" was to be applied to the
"-noncommercial, nonprofit activity" at issue in the case at bar). Some commentators have
criticized the Supreme Court for relying solely on the work of commentator Melville Nim-
mer for this proposition, without adequate explanation or citation to case law.See PATRY ON
FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 6:5 (arguing that the "handful of cases cited by Professor Nim-
mer do not bear out his assertion").
32. Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51; see also Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 917, 943-44 (2005) (discussing the Court's rationale for the Sony provision).
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Although the Court cast some doubt on the Sony presumption in
Harper & Row,33 the presumption was apparently reaffirmed in Stew-
art v. Abend.34 During the period between Harper & Row and Stewart
v. Abend, despite the ambiguity created by Harper & Row, the Sony
presumption was readily applied by most lower courts. The effect
on potential markets, buttressed by commerciality, thus remained the
dominant factor in the fair use analysis.
However, just four years later, the Court appeared to reverse
course in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. 36 "Apparently abandoning the idea
that any factor enjoys primacy, Campbell instructs that '[a]ll [four
factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright."' 37 Indeed, the Court seemed to chide
the Court of Appeals for "applying a presumption ostensibly culled
from Sony" that commercial use is always unfair, calling commer-
ciality just one element of the first factor analysis to be weighed in a
"sensitive balancing of interests." 39 Liberally invoking Harper &
Row, while all but ignoring Stewart v. Abend, the Court treated this as
a settled question and criticized the Court of Appeals for not recogniz-
ing it as such:
Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presump-
tion. . . . The Court of Appeals's elevation of one
sentence from Sony to a per se rule thus runs as
much counter to Sony itself as to the long common-
law tradition of fair use adjudication. Rather, as we
explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the
33. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). The
Harper & Row, Court initially stated that "[t]he fact that a publication was commercial as
opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use,"
suggesting a certain equality among factors. Id. The Court immediately hedged this observa-
tion, however, by quoting the presumptive language from Sony and weighing the "profit
from exploitation" heavily against the defendant. Id.
34. 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (invoking the Sony presumption without reference to
Harper & Row, and apparently rejecting any suggestion that Harper & Roiw had altered the
landscape).
35. See, e.g., Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 844
(11th Cir. 1990) (applying the presumption in a factor one analysis and finding that defe-
dant's "flagrant commercial purpose... cannot be disguised as fair use"); Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the
presumption and extending it to factor four). But see, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell,
803 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiffs assertion that the commercial
nature of defendant's use mandated judgment against him, and further rejecting the sugges-
tion that the Sony "Court intended to attach heightened significance to the element of com-
merciality").
36. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
37. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 894 (2d Cir. 1994) (alteration in
original) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578).
38. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-84.
39. Id. at 584-85 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 455 n.40 (1984)).
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proposition that the "fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate fac-
tor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use."
But that is all, and . . . even the force of that ten-
dency will vary with the context ... .40
In a sharp departure, the Campbell Court expressly limited appli-
cation of the commercial-use market-harm presumption to that narrow
band of cases in which the defendant engaged in "mere duplication
for commercial purposes." 4 1 Reaching back to Justice Story's Folsom
decision, the Court found that such duplication "clearly 'supersede[s]
the objects . . .' of the original and [thus] serves as a market replace-
ment for it."42 Market harm to the original is therefore likely.43 Absent
40. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85 (citations omitted) (quoting Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Campbell Court
"rejected" the Sony presumption). Campbell appeared to debunk the Sony presumption once
and for all. See Pierre J. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair
Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 22 (1994) [hereinafter Leval, Justice Souter's
Rescue of Fair Use] (describing Campbell as having "fixed the rudder and restored the
compass bearing" in fair use analysis by, inter alia, clearly eliminating the "pernicious
'commercial use' presumption"). But see Beebe, supra note 24, at 601-02 (invoking empiri-
cal data to "suggest that Judge Leval may have been overly pessimistic with respect to how
judges used the Sony presumption before Campbell, but overly optimistic with respect to
how they would use it after Campbell"). The Sony presumption remains a stubborn fixture
in fair use case law, applied in some of even the most recent cases. See, e.g., Leadsinger,
Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying a rule gleaned from
Sony that "commercial use of copyrighted material is 'presumptively an unfair exploitation
of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright' (quoting Sony, 464
U.S. at 451)). Indeed, Barton Beebe's empirical study of copyright fair use cases found a
"renewal of interest in the presumption among some lower courts" applying the first factor,
calling the Sony presumption an "exceptionally tenacious meme[] in the fair use case law."
See Beebe, supra note 24, at 601-02.
Part of this tenaciousness can perhaps be explained by the relationship between the
first factor's "commercial use" inquiry and the fourth factor's "market effect" analysis. In
evaluating the fourth factor, the Sony court recognized oppositional evidentiary presump-
tions arising from the commercial/noncommercial distinction. 464 U.S. at 451. Commercial
use should be treated as a "presumptively . . . unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege"
that inhibits the copyright holder's ability to capitalize on potential markets and thus the
incentive to create. Id. Noncommercial use is comparatively less likely to have this effect.
Id. Thus, noncommercial use would carry no presumption of market harm and instead re-
quire a showing of either actual harm or the likelihood of future harm caused by the chal-
lenged use. Id.
41. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added) (noting, inter alia, that Sony involved
the "verbatim copying" of television shows); see also Christina Mitakis, The E-RatedIndus-
try: Fair Use Sheep or Infringing Goat?, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 291, 300 (2004)
(describing Campbell's reworking of the market-harm presumption). The Campbell decision
arguably called into question the very existence of a market-harm presumption, even under
these limited circumstances, by saying only that it "minght find support in Sony." Campbell,
510 U.S. at 591 (emphasis added).
42. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
43. Id. (stating that this conclusion "simply makes common sense").
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"mere duplication for commercial purposes," however, no such pre-
sumption of market replacement and market harm is supported. 44
In narrowing the effect of the commercial/noncommercial distinc-
tion - premised on the distinction between mere duplication and al-
teration - Campbell circled back to the first factor and the newly
recognized doctrine of transformative use,45 noting that "the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use."46 Although drawn from prior sources, the concept of transforma-
tive use was most famously articulated in Judge Leval's 1990 law
review article, Toward a Fair Use Standard.47 Linking transforma-
44. Id. As discussed supra note 40, however, the Sony presumption is an "exceptionally
tenacious meme[] in the fair use case law." Beebe, supra note 24, at 601-02. See, e.g., Elvis
Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2003); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony for the proposition
that market harm can be assumed with commercial uses of a copyrighted work); PATRY ON
FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 3:4 (observing that "so effective has Campbell been in purging
fair use of the nest of presumptions and anticommercial prejudices that had grown up, that it
is quite common for courts of appeals to describe a user's commercial purpose as virtually
irrelevant" but that "[o]ther panels, however, continue to characterize commercial uses
negatively").
45. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (setting mere duplication and transformative use in oppo-
sition, and concluding that "when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market
substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred").
46. Id. at 579. Transformativeness exists on a sliding scale. The more transformative the
subsequent work, the less significant the other factors- including commercialism. This is
because a commercial work that is highly transformative is likely to add new and original
work to the marketplace, serving the goals of copyright, without regard to its commercial
nature. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to
Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 1/S: J.L. & POL'Y
FOR INFO. Soc'Y 67, 83-85 (2010) (discussing the link between transformativeness and the
goals of copyright). This oppositional relationship between transformativeness and the other
fair use factors helps to explain the Campbell Court's rather drastic contraction of Sony's
broad presumption of market harm. The Campbell Court limited the market harm presump-
tion to commercial works of "mere duplication" not because of their commercial purpose,
but because identical or verbatim copies are significantly more likely to serve as a substitute
in the market for the original goods. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. Outside of this singular
circumstance, however, the Court declined to recognize any operative market harm pre-
sumption or factor grounded in transformativeness, but instead maintained the analytical
distinction between these parallel but discrete inquiries. See id. at 577 94.
47. Judge Leval argued prior to the Campbell decision that:
Factor One's direction that we "consider[] ... the purpose and
character ofthe use" raises the question of justification. Does the use
fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public
illumination? This question is vitally importantto the fair use inquiry,
and lies at the heart of the fair user's case. Recent judicial opinions
have not sufficiently recognized its importance.
In analyzing a fair use defense, it is not sufficient simply to
conclude whether or not justification exists. The question remains
how powerful, or persuasive, is the justification, because the court
must weigh the strength of the secondary user's justification against
factors favoring the copyright owner.
I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primar-
ily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transforma-
live.
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tiveness to the purposes of copyright and the justification of fair use
accommodation, Leval offered:
The use must be productive and must employ the
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different
purpose from the original. A quotation of copy-
righted material that merely repackages or repub-
lishes the original is unlikely to pass the test . . . . If,
on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to
the original - if the quoted matter is used as raw
material, transformed in the creation of new informa-
tion, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings - this is the very type of activity that the fair
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society.48
The Campbell decision employed Leval's transformative use
standard, albeit in adapted form. Laying out the basic principles atten-
dant to the first factor of the fair use inquiry, the Court stated that:
This factor draws on Justice Story's formulation,
"the nature and objects of the selections made." The
enquiry here may be guided by the examples given
in the preamble to § 107 . . . . The central purpose of
this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words,
whether the new work merely "supersede[s] the ob-
jects" of the original creation, or instead adds some-
thing new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words,
whether and to what extent the new work is "trans-
formative." 49
In application, the Court noted, works of transformative value "can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in
the process, creating a new one."5 0
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1111 (1990) [here-
inafter Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard] (alteration and omission in original) (footnotes
omitted).
48. Id. (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
49. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841); Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note 47, at 1111).
50. Id. at 579. The Court then evaluated the parodic nature of the infringing work, id. at
580-83, but offered little more on the concept of transformativeness itself.
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In moderating the commerciality inquiry relative to transforma-
tiveness, the Campbell Court sought to anchor fair use analysis more
firmly to what it termed the principal goals of copyright:
Although such transformative use is not absolutely
necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copy-
right, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doc-
trine's guarantee of breathing space within the con-
fines of copyright, and the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against
a finding of fair use. 1
As this passage from Campbell suggests, a primary goal of copyright
is to provide a public benefit by expanding the available body of
"new" expression. Two statutory mechanisms are employed to pro-
mote the creation of these new works. The first mechanism (some
would say the primary mechanism) provides authors of new works
with an artificially limited monopoly in those works, thereby facilitat-
ing a market in which to exploit their value.52 These are the Section
106 rights. The second mechanism secures space for others to use
protected works as raw materials in the production of new works. 54
This is the Section 107 fair use defense.55 Fair use not only serves the
goals of copyright by permitting the creation of new works, but also
attends to First Amendment concerns regarding restrictions on free
expression. The fair use analysis thus seeks a socially optimal point
of equilibrium between the grant of substantive rights of exploitation
51. Id. at 579 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (embracing the district court's determi-
nation "that the commercial aspect [of the subsequent work] was not significant in light of
[its] transformative nature"). Campbell notes, however, an "obvious statutory exception to
this focus on transformative uses [in] the straight reproduction of multiple copies for class-
room distribution." 510 U.S. at 579 n.11. This is precisely the point on which the dissent in
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. thought the majority erred,
when the majority held that a copy house could not serve as a money-making middleman
between professors and students in printing and selling coursepacks, despite their obvious
educational nature. 99 F.3d 1381, 1400 (6th Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
52. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
54. This mechanism raises the question of whether the subsequent creator should himself
be incentivized through the provision of substantive rights in the new work. This question
implicates the difficult intersection between transformativeness and the derivative work
right.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
56. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 20.
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in the original work and the accommodation of subsequent works that
draw from that protected expression.
Because transformativeness is weighed on both sides of this equi-
librium, transformativeness can sometimes appear to dominate the fair
use analysis. First, transformative works are more likely to further the
purposes of copyright by adding something new - "a further purpose
or different character, . . . new expression, meaning, or message."58
Second, although the market harm analysis is distinct from that of
purpose and character, as a descriptive matter transformative works
are generally less likely to serve as market substitutes for the original
work upon which they draw, thereby disincentivizing the copyright
holder by usurping the market for the original work.59
III. SOCIAL SEMIOTICS AND TRANSFORMATIVE USE
Transformativeness is a core concept in the fair use analysis, of-
ten framed as crucial to the outcome of a particular case. The prevail-
ing conception of transformativeness is one of romantic authorship,
evidenced by a defendant's authorial purpose or activity. However,
this prevailing conception of transformativeness creates a doctrinal
conflict between mechanisms of monopoly incentive and boundaries
of accommodation, imposing a rivalry of incentivized authors that is
at odds with the purposes of fair use. This Article proposes an alter-
nate conception of transformativeness to supplement, rather than re-
place, the authorship model. This approach, grounded in social
semiotic theory, attempts to account for the multiple and divergent
meanings created as various interpretive communities engage a par-
ticular work, clearing "breathing space"60 in which this process of
meaning-making may occur.
57. E.g., Marques, supra note 28, at 335 ("[A] use is usually fair if it can serve the dual
purposes of stimulating the public's wealth of knowledge without diminishing incentivesfor
creativity.").
58. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
59. See Wong, supra note 14, at 1129 (observing that there is an "uncertain relationship
between transformativeness (and more generally, the first fair use factor) and the fourth
factor of market harm"). However, it should be noted that any relationship between trans-
formativeness and substitutive market harm is non-operative - merely an observed inverse
correlation. Moreover, focusing the market substitution analysis on transformativeness
dilutes both the market comparison at the heart of market harm and the transformativeness
inquiry. Transformativeness is in essence subsumed into the question of market substitution
and, in most cases, the determination of market harm. Maintaining the distinction between
market harm analysis and transformativeness allows the fair use analysis to seek that point
of equilibrium previously discussed: between the incentives provided by the copyright
holder's substantive right to exploit the original work and the public benefit derived from
accommodating the creation of new works that draw from that protected expression. See
supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
60. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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A. Prevailing Conceptions of Transformativeness and Authorial
Presence
Laura Heymann observes a crucial shift between Judge Leval's
articulation of transformative use and that of the Supreme Court in
Campbell.6 Omitted from Campbell is Leval's reference to "produc-
tive" use, as well as to "secondary use [that] adds value to the origi-
nal." 62 Likewise, Campbell does not specify the use of the original
work as "raw materials" to create "new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings."63 Instead, Campbell looks at the
extent to which a subsequent work alters the original work by
"add[ing] something new," in the form of a new expression, new
- 64meaning, or new message.
Heymann interprets this shift as encouraging courts to focus the
transformativeness inquiry on "authorial presence" and the degree to
which the defendant has engaged in "authorial activity."65
This language represents a subtle shift, to be sure,
but one that - at least on its face - seems to en-
courage courts to focus on whether the second artist
has added material to the first work to the exclusion
of consideration of whether the artist has recontextu-
alized the copyrighted work. In other words, Camp-
bell suggests that the focus should be not on whether
the defendant has transformed the meaning of the
work but on what the defendant has done to the
work - a shift in focus from reader interpretation to
authorial activity.
61. See Laura A. Heymann, Everything is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Re-
sponse, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 452 (2008).
62. Id. ("[W]hen the Court incorporated this language into its opinion in Campbell, it en-
gaged in a bit of subtle, but important, transformation itself No longer was the focus on
whether the use of the copyrighted work was 'productive' or 'add[ed] value to the origi-
nal' .... " (alteration in original) (quoting Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note
47, at 1111)).
63. Heymann, supra note 61, at 452 (noting that in Campbell, the focus was no longer on
what Leval called "new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings"
(quoting Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note 47, at 1111)); see Campbell, 510
U.S. at 579.
64. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
65. Heymann, supra note 61, at 452.
66. Id. (noting that Campbell "suggests that 'transformativeness' depends to a significant
extent on evaluating the second artist's creative activity: when and how strongly he assetts
his own authorial presence"); see, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d
792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We decline to consider Mattel's survey in assessing whether
Forsythe's work can be reasonably perceived as a parody. Parody is an objectively defined
rhetorical device."); Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280
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Beyond an isolated comparison of the two standards, her claim is dif-
ficult to assess because the analysis in Campbell itself is so myopi-
cally focused on parody as a singular category of use. There is,
indeed, no mention of productive use, new information, aesthetics,
insights or understandings - all concepts invoked by Leval to de-
scribe transformative use. Campbell does use the word "value"
both in terms of "transformative value"69 and "social value"70  but
without clear reference to a "secondary use [that] adds value to the
original," as Leval contextualizes the term.71 Indeed, in the case of
parody, its social value generally lies in criticism of and commentary
on the original work,72 often lessening the economic value of its target
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that disagreement regarding the "success" of a parody is not rele-
vant to fair use protection where the author has employed parodic elements).
67. Some commentators have argued that, by citing to Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Sony, the Campbell Court implicitly incorporated "productive use" as part of the transfor-
mativeness standard. For instance, Stephen Wilson has argued:
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose the Supreme Court enthusiastically em-
braced productive use. The Court stated that the primary inquiry un-
der the first fair use factor is whether the secondary use supersedes
the original work or adds something new, thereby incorporating a
new meaning or message. By placing an emphasis on determining
whether the secondary use was productive, the Court effectively em-
braced Justice Blackmun's definition of productive use, which he ar-
ticulated in his Sony dissent. Furthermore, Campbell adopted Justice
Blackmun's inquiry into whether the secondary work incorporated
some "added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first
author's work."
Stephen R. Wilson, Rewarding Creativity: Transformative Use in the Jazz Idiom, U. PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y, 10 (2003), hftp://tlp.law.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol-IV-
Wilson.pdf (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984)). This conclusion requires a rather broad leap, particularly in its
reliance on the Court's citation to Blackmun's Sony dissent. Nevertheless, there is some
evidence that Leval considered Campbell to have reaffirmed a place for productive use in
the fair use inquiry: "[Sony] was generally taken to mean that productivity was no longer a
useful or important standard. . . . Having been deprived of its most important compass bear-
ing, the doctrine then drifted aimlessly without a governing standard for ten years" until the
Campbell decision. Leval, Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, supra note 40, at 20. Per-
haps the more difficult question is the relationship between transformative use and produc-
tive use, which Leval himself has struggled to articulate. See, e.g., Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, supra note 47, at 1121 (referring to transformative and productive justifica-
tions as distinct); id. at 1111, 1127 (using productive to describe or define transformative).
68. See Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note 47, at 1111.
69. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 ("Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value . . .
70. Id. at 599.
71. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra note 47, at 1111.
72. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 ("Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it
can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process creating
a new one."); id. at 599 ("Factor four thus underscores the importance of ensuring that the
parody is in fact an independent creative work, which is why the parody must 'make some
critical comment or statement about the original work which reflects the original perspective
of the parodist- thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertainment func-
tion."' (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979))).
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by suppressing demand.73 Whether criticism and commentary on the
original work can add social value to that underlying work seems a
highly subjective question. In this context, the social value of the
parodic work is consistent with Heymann's characterization of Camp-
bell as viewing transformative use through the lens of authorial activ-
ity.74
Given Campbell's rather truncated treatment of transformative
use, perhaps the more useful sources for evaluating Heymann's inter-
pretation are subsequent fair use decisions applying Campbell's trans-
formativeness standard. A number of commentators have attempted to
bring structure to these cases by organizing transformative use into
categories, types, clusters, and so on. William Patry, for instance, de-
fines transformative uses as those "that employ the original for a dif-
ferent objective from the original."75 He then breaks transformative
use into three descriptive categories: "(1) an alteration of the authorial
content[;] (2) no change in the form of the original, but a use that per-
forms a valuable purpose; or (3) no change or alteration, but rather the
presentation of the original intact in a new context or with new in-
sights."7 6
Anthony Reese begins by distinguishing between two types of
transformativeness: (1) transforming a work's content, and (2) using a
work for a transformative purpose77 - "serv[ing] a different function
than the original work."78 Evaluating appellate court decisions involv-
ing fair use, he divides the courts' opinions into four categories:
73. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94 (discussing effects on potential markets); see also
infra notes 286-289 and accompanying text.
74. See Heymann, supra note 61, at 452.
75. See PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 3:9.
76. Id.
77. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 484-85 (2008).
78. Id. at 485 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th
Cir. 2007)). In further describing transformative purpose, Reese discusses four cases in
which "the court's conclusion as to transformativeness rested on its view of the defendant's
transformative purpose, even in the absence of any transformation of the content of the
plaintiffs work." Id. at 488-89; see Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 ("Although an image may
have been created originally to serve an entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function,
[defendants' use] transforms the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of informa-
tion."); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (the use "serves a
different function than [the copyright owner's] use -improving access to information on
the internet versus artistic expression"); Nufiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18,
23 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[P]laintiffs' photographs were originally intended to appear in modeling
portfolios, not in the newspaper; the former use, not the latter, motivated the creation of the
work."). Additionally, Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d
Cir. 2006) held:
DK's purpose in using the copyrighted images at issue in its biogm-
phy of the Grateful Dead is plainly different from the original purpose
for which they were created. Originally, each of BGA's images ful-
filled the dual purposes of artistic expression and promotion [of live
concerts].... In contrast, DK used each of BGA's images as histori-
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1. The defendant has transformed the content of the
plaintiffs copyrighted work and is using it for a
transformative purpose.
2. The defendant has transformed the content of the
plaintiffs copyrighted work but is not using it for a
transformative purpose.
3. The defendant has not transformed the content of
the plaintiffs copyrighted work but is using the
copyrighted work for a transformative purpose.
4. The defendant has not transformed the content of
the plaintiffs copyrighted work and is not using the
copyrighted work for a transformative purpose.79
Categories one and four - what Reese termed "double or nothing"
trans formativeness - produced "relatively straightforward" results,
with transformativeness weighing in favor of fair use in the category
one and against fair use in category four.80 In the "either-or" cases
captured in categories two and three, a defendant's transformative
purpose was far more likely to produce a finding of transformative-
ness than alterations to the work's content.81
Pamela Samuelson attempts to build on the empirical work of
Barton Beebe by organizing fair use cases into "clusters." 82 Under
Samuelson's approach, transformative use is classified as a subset of
fair use cases implicating First Amendment interests. Transformative
uses include (1) parodies, (2) other transformative criticism of the
original work, and (3) transformative adaptations of the original work
as an expression of artistic imagination.83 Two additional clusters
among those implicating First Amendment interests are classified as
nontransformative, although they may fit within those transformative
uses identified by Patry and Reese. 84 The first, "productive uses in
critical commentary," includes "iterative[] copie[s] ... of another's
copyrighted work [used] in preparing a new work critical of the first
cal artifacts to document and represent the actual occurrence of
Grateful Dead concert events featured on Illustrated Trip's timeline.
Id. at 609.
79. See Reese, supra note 77, at 486.
80.Id at 486-88.
81.Id. at 488 -94.
82. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2537, 2541-43
(2009).
83. Id. at 2546-55. Although Samuelson presents a narrow conception of transformative
use, her overall treatment of fair use is rather broad.
84. See PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 3:9; Reese, supra note 77, at 486.
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author's work."85 The second, "iterative copying for orthogonal pur-
poses," is defined by the "necess[ity], in order to make an effective
critical commentary, to make or publish iterative copies of the whole
or significant parts of a copyrighted work for a different (i.e., or-
thogonal) speech-related purpose than the original."8 6 Other uses that
may be thought of as transformative are categorized as clusters impli-
cating the productive use of other authors' works, rather than First
Amendment interests. These include use in social or cultural commen-
tary, use to set historical context, and use in a reference work.87
The various categories of use identified by Patry, Reese, and
Samuelson are largely consistent with Heymann's interpretation of
transformative use post-Campbell. Expressive authorial activity is
most clearly evidenced where the transformative purpose of the sub-
sequent use is to provide criticism of the original work, including par-
ody.89 Likewise, expressive authorial activity can be found where the
original work is used for the transformative purpose of commenting
on some general characteristic or aspect of that work, or the class of
works to which it belongs.90 Finally, expressive authorial activity has
been found in some cases where the transformative purpose is to
comment both on the original and on some aspect of society at large. 91
85. Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2555.
86. Id. at 2557.
87. See id. at 2570-75. Samuelson does not classify these as transformative uses, but, as
discussed infra, courts have treated them as such.
88. As Reese observes, using a work for a transformative purpose that "serves a different
function than the original work" is more likely to produce a finding of transformativeness
than alterations to the content of the underlying work. Reese, supra note 77, at 484-87.
89. See, e.g., Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI,
2008 WL 2951281, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (finding the transformative purpose of
defendants' use was "to criticize and comment on plaintiffs statements and views"); see
also Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2557 (citing Savage as an example of "iterative copying
for orthogonal purposes"). All three purpose-oriented categories fall into either category (1)
or (3) of Reese's categorization. See Reese, supra note 77, at 486.
90. See, e.g., Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 3802(HB), 2001 WL
1111970, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F.
Supp. 2d 442, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (involving the use of original video footage); Hofheinz
v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
91. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the defendant's
use to be "commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media"); Lennon
v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the defen-
dants' use to be criticism of the original song, of John Lennon's naIve views, and of anti-
religious views in society). Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir. 1986), decided pre-Campbell, implicates similar transformative purposes, although
accomplished primarily through a change in context and audience. Hustler had produced a
parody critical of the Moral Majority and its leader, Jerry Falwell. Id. at 1149. Defendants
responded with a mailer to their constituents that included copies of the parody in its en-
tirety, but sought "to rebut the personal attack upon Falwell and make a political comment
about pornography." Id. at 1153. Thus, the new purpose was primarily expressive of the
defendant's views. See Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2557 58 (citing Hustler as an example
of "iterative copying for orthogonal purposes"). It should be noted that defendants' mailer
also included a plea for donations, however, this fundraising purpose was offset by the
critical nature of the subsequent use. Hustler, 796 F.2d at 1152 53.
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Another group of transformative purpose cases requires more ex-
ploration. In these cases, the defendant's transformative purpose is not
to criticize the original work, the class of works to which it belongs,
or even society at large. Rather, defendant uses these works as refer-
ential objects within a new authorial work. For instance, in Bill Gra-
ham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the author of a book on the
Grateful Dead used unadulterated concert posters to set the historical
context for his commentary. 92 In this new context, the original works
were no longer used primarily for artistic expression and promotion
purposes, but had been transformed into historical artifacts. 93 Like-
wise, in Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, where por-
tions of a series of original works of fiction were used in creating a
guide to the series,94 their purpose was transformed from entertain-
ment to reference. 95 Finally, in N6fiez v. Caribbean International
News Corp., the defendant used an unaltered photograph intended to
appear in a modeling portfolio in a newspaper story concerning the
model and her appearance in that photo.96 The use of these works as
referential objects, although not within the universe of archetypal
transformativeness cases, nevertheless evidences authorial activity
through the expressive nature of their use.
B. Imbalances Between Monopoly Incentive and Accommodation
By focusing the transformative use analysis so narrowly on the
degree to which a defendant has engaged in authorial activity, courts
reflect and reinforce an imbalance in the equilibrium between monop-
oly incentive and accommodation, thereby failing to maximize the
public benefit at the heart of copyright.97 The analysis of authorial
activity is centered primarily on a defendant's process, intent, and
purpose;98 whether in terms of bad faith, willingness to engage in
creative work, how readers are to use the work, the impact or effect of
92. 448 F.3d 605, 609 10 (2d Cir. 2006).
93. Id.; see also Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2573-74 (citing Graham as an example of
use to set historical context); Reese, supra note 77, at 489-90 (citing Graham as an example
of use for a transformative purpose).
94. 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
95. See id. at 541-44 (comparing the original entertainment and aesthetic purposes with
the referential purposes of the subsequent work); see also Samuelson, supra note 82, at
2574-75 (citing RDR Books as an example of use in a reference work).
96. 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Reese, supra note 77, at 489 (citing Nfilez as
an example of use for a transformative purpose).
97. See supra notes 52 58 and accompanying text.
98. See Heymann, supra note 61, at 448 49 ("[C]ourts often, as the word 'purpose' sug-
gests, focus their analysis on the creator of the second work. The question then becomes not
how the work is perceived or interpreted but what the author intended or hoped to
achieve."); see also Wong, supra note 14, at 1109-10 (noting that after Campbell,
",courts ... have tended to focus largely on the purpose of the defendant's use, rather than
the result thereof').
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the work, or the markets to be served. 99 This emphasis on the relation-
ship between the defendant and the work she has produced reflects the
dominant roles of authorship and originality in copyright law, oo as
well as the system of incentives and protections that rewards authorial
activities.101 As a result, fair use analysis - although premised on
finding "breathing space" 102 within the tangle of existing protec-
tions - tends toward these dominant attributes of protection, rather
than space and accommodation. 103 This accounts, in significant part,
for the ongoing conflict between transformative fair use and deriva-
tive work rights, whether accruing to the original author or to the sub-
sequent user.104
Mary Wong, addressing the law's treatment of user-generated
content,105 argues that copyright law should focus less on the defen-
dant's purpose and more on the resulting work as it exists in soci-
ety.106 With the rise of participatory culture, she argues, the audience
has evolved from a passive consumer of content into an empowered
active participant, even to the point of co-creation or collaboration. 107
Copyright law should adapt to this development, she argues, by
reconceptualizing the fair use analysis:
It may be more useful ... and better serve the
understanding of the integral role of users in copy-
right law to approach the transformativeness ques-
tion by instead asking what the plaintiffs work has
become as a result of the defendant's additions and
changes.... Requiring the court to also look at the
result of the defendant's actions, and not just the
99. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text (discussing categories or clusters of
fair use decisions, focusing on authorial process, intent, and purpose).
100. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
347, 348 (2005) ("[C]opyright is first and foremost a law of authors' rights. . . .").
101. See Wong, supra note 14, at 1097 ("[C]opyright law in policy and practice ... has
emphasized . . . the importance of incentives and protection for the author/publisher.").
102. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
103. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How, Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 562 (2004) (describing the narrow-
ing of fair use that results from attempts to fit transformativeness into our traditional con-
ceptions of authorship and originality).
104. See Wong, supra note 14, at 1105 ("it seems patently unnecessary to contradict the
statement that 'only authors, but not copycats, should be entitled to fair use privilege,' but
the evolution . .. of a fair use test that relies heavily on the transformative nature of the use
raises the further question of whether transformativeness equals authorship in the derivative
work context." (footnote omitted) (quoting Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency,
and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY 347, 371 (1997)).
105. See Wong, supra note 14; see also Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of
the Masses: A Manifesto for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921
(2009); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 497 (2008).
106. See Wong, supra note 14, at 1109 10.
107. Id. at 1097.
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substance and purpose of those actions, would ....
underscore the objective of the transformativeness
inquiry ... namely, to evaluate whether in fact the
defendant did ultimately transform the plaintiffs
work by giving it a new meaning, information, or
expression and thereby adding to progress and the
advancement of learning.108
This approach stands in contrast to the general tendency of copyright
law to undervalue the audience1 09 by "highlight[ing] the vital part
played by the user - in many respects as much an 'author' as the
initial creator - in copyriht and in contributing to a vibrant culture
of knowledge creation." In the context of user-generated content
this approach makes a great deal of sense.
Despite turning the focus away from what the defendant did and
why, and toward the resulting work, Wong maintains the emphasis on
authorship, incentive, and protection.1 1 She focuses on the defen-
dant's authorial activity, whether by addition or alteration - as
someone who "gives" the work "new meaning, information, or ex-
pression." 112 By focusing on the degree to which the defendant has
engaged in authorial activity, Wong's approach to the transformative-
ness inquiry raises two related substantive challenges. The first chal-
lenge is to determine whether "the emphasis that Campbell placed on
transformativeness in fair use analysis will affect the scope of the
copyright owner's derivative work right to control forms in which her
work is transformed." 13 The second challenge is to determine
whether a work constituting transformative fair use, and therefore not
infringing, will qualify for copyright protection in its own right. 114
Wong therefore undertakes to define a standard that not only "se-
cur[es] justifiable secondary markets for the initial author, but also ...
108. Id. at 1109 (emphases added) (arguing that this would come closer to the obiective
standard from Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), and Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
109. See id at 1097; see also Cohen, supra note 100, at 347 ("Copyright doctrine ... is
characterized by the absence of the user.").
110. Wong, supra note 14, at 1112; see also Halbert, supra note 105, at 924 ("User-
generated content is in reality authorship and creative work. . . .").
111. See Wong, supra note 14, at 1090-91, 1115. Wong does argue that the originality
requirement should be modified in these situations. Id.
112. Id. at 1109.
113. Reese, supra note 77, at 468; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and
Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 703 (2010) ("[C]ourts have strug-
gled ... to distinguish the sort of transformation that counts for fair use analysis from the
sort of transformation that violates the exclusive right to prepare derivative works."); Wil-
son, supra note 67, at 8 (stating a "fundamental question" as "whether creating a new work
based on an existing work falls within the definition of a derivative work or under the trans-
formative use component of the fair use doctrine").
114. See Wong, supra note 14, at 1118-19.
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encourag[es] creativity - and thereby progress - through protection
of derivative creations that represent a substantive change from the
initial work."1 15 By conceptualizing the issue as one of authorship,
however, the fair use inquiry becomes hopelessly mired in the recon-
ciliation of competing claims of protection.
This approach asks too much, and indeed more than necessary, of
fair use. The fair use doctrine is not, after all, concerned with incentiv-
izing the creation of new works through the grant of monopoly.
Rather, the heart of the fair use doctrine is its "guarantee of breathing
space within the confines of copyright."116 Indeed, the value of the
transformativeness inquiry hinges on the interplay between monopoly
incentive and accommodation, seeking a point of equilibrium between
these two mechanisms rather than assuming that the transformative
work should receive protection for the same reasons as the original
work. Wong's work is important because it properly shifts the focus
of the transformativeness inquiry away from what the defendant did
or intended to do, and toward the resulting work in its relationship
with the audience or user. But in making this shift, it is unnecessary to
take that next step - seeking to tie the concept of transformative fair
use to the authorial requirement for copyright protection in the subse-
quent work.
This tendency to infuse the transformativeness analysis with mo-
nopoly incentive theories reflects one iteration of "the author ef-
fect."117 From this perspective, two ideologies have come to dominate
all aspects of copyright law and policy, obscuring nearly any claim to
the public interest in new works that is not grounded in a model of
property-like rights and economic reward. The first is a romantic ideal
of author-as-genius, a wellspring of art and originality, to be compen-
sated for sharing her gifts with the public.118 The second is a Lockean
theory, closely allied with natural law, in which authorship-as-labor is
justly rewarded with a property-like right of exclusive exploitation. 119
115. Id. at 1116.
116. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (emphasis added).
117. See generally Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Col-
lective Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN
LAW AND LITERATURE 29 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Martha Wood-
mansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 15, supra, at 15, 17.
118. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 105, at 928 (discussing "the myth of the romantic and
original artist"); Fiona Macmillan, Artistic Practice and the Integrity of Copyright Law, in
ART AND LAW: THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE 49, 71-72 (Morten Rosenmeier & Stina Teil-
mann, eds., 2005) (describing personality right justifications for copyright protection as
"based on the argument that a work is the embodiment of the personality of the creator and,
therefore, should be subject to the creator's ownership and/or control").
119. See Macmillan, supra note 118, at 71 (describing a natural rights justification of
copyright protection "said to spring from Lockean theories of property and involve the
proposition that the author is entitled to a reward for the creation of the work in question"
and noting that "copyright provides an economic incentive to creators and exploiters of
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Certain critical theorists, particularly those aligned with the law
and literature movement, challenge the dominance of the romantic
ideal and the Lockean theory in copyright doctrine.120 They recognize
authorship as a social construction rather than a truth, while they con-
ceive of the creative process as collaborative rather than insular.121
Indeed, many post-structuralists argue that originality is not a condi-
tion of authorship, 122 thereby contesting one of the foundational justi-
fications for copyright. Post-structuralists replace the concept of the
romantic author with a focus on the text itself, the meaning of which
is no longer controlled by author subjectivity. Meaning is not trans-
mitted from author to audience, but is instead intertextual. New texts
borrow from prior texts and are interpreted through their relationship
to the larger body of existing works. 123 The meaning of a text is thus
shaped by its social context among other texts.
One can persuasively argue that these critical theories are simply
too radical to be useful in the formulation of copyright law and policy.
Practically speaking, the challenge to romantic authorship and domi-
nant ideologies of originality would implicate a drastic reduction, or
even elimination, of authors' rights. These theories would therefore be
difficult to apply to existing copyright doctrine without unacceptably
undermining the existing institutionalized allocation of rights and in-
copyright work, thus encouraging the creation and dissemination of cultural works with
consequent cultural development" (footnotes omitted)) .
120. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be for Ever Caught Between Market-
place and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 159 (Brad Sherman & Alain
Strowel eds., 1994); Jaszi, supra note 117, at 29; Woodmansee, supra note 117, at 28 ("In
short, the law has yet to be affected by the 'critique of authorship' initiated by Foucault and
carried forward in the rich variety of post-structuralist research that has characterized liter-
ary studies in the last two decades."); Elton Fukumoto, Note, The Author Effect After the
"Death of the Author ": Copyright in a Postinodern Age, 72 WASH. L. REv. 903 (1997); see
also Roger Chartier, Figures of the Author, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra, at 7.
121. See, e.g., RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 239 (1996) ("[W]hat humans are able to think and create at
the current stage of history is due to the contributions of all humanity."); Jaszi, supra note
117, at 40 ("Copyright law, with its emphasis on rewarding and safeguarding 'originality,'
has lost sight of the cultural value of what might be called 'serial collaborations' - works
resulting from successive elaborations of an idea or text by a series of creative workers,
occurring perhaps over years or decades.").
122. See, e.g., BETTIG, supra note 121, at 239 ("[Intellectual property law] is built upon a
notion of individual artists creating in a pure state of nature. Clearly, this is not how intellaz-
tual and artistic works are created."); WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE
COPYRIGHT WARS 74 (2009) ("[A]lthough many authors fervently believe in their own
absolute originality or novelty, in the colloquial and legal meanings of those terms, the truth
is far different."); Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction, in THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 117, at 1, 8 ("Today .... law has missed out on the contempo-
rary 'critique of authorship'- the impulse, especially in literary studies, to put in question
the naturalness and inevitability of Romantic ideas about creativity.").
123. See, e.g., Fukumoto, supra note 120, at 910 ("Opposition to the New Critics' em-
phasis on the individual work arose in the criticism of influential literary theorists . . . who[]
viewed literature as intertextual.. . . [O]ne could best understand a given work of literature
by understanding literature as a whole.").
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terests. Moreover, this approach raises questions about our current
conception of fair use. Challenging the ideologies of authorship and
originality implicates a dramatic cut in the substantive rights of the
first claimant, rather than an accommodation of subsequent transfor-
mative works within a framework of copyright protection.
Still, certain aspects of the critical theories aligned with the law
and literature movement are useful to a more expansive model of
transformative fair use that addresses both monopoly incentive and
accommodation concerns. First, these critical theories shift the focus
away from works of authorship and toward audience engagement with
the text. This mitigates the tendency to overvalue, through a monop-
oly interest, those who most closely fit the image of the romantic
author and to undervalue both prior works and the audience. Second,
these critical theories acknowledge that an author does not control the
meaning of a work. Instead, meaning is determined, at least in part,
through intertextual processes. This opens the door to a reconsidera-
tion of meaning-making and the role of audiences in that process, with
significant implications for copyright doctrine.
C. An Alternate Conception of Transformativeness
Given the parallel foci on authorial purpose or activity and the
creation of new works, it is not surprising that Wong and others are
forced to wrestle with competing authorial claims to monopoly incen-
tives and exclusive rights. They measure social value not by whether
the allegedly infringing work has expanded the available body of new
expression, but rather by whether the defendant satisfies our concep-
tions of a worthy author. From this traditional narrow perspective on
social value, the creator of the subsequent work is thus judged by the
same standard of romantic authorship, regardless of whether the de-
fendant's claim is for monopoly incentives and exclusive rights or a
more circumscribed claim for accommodation under the fair use de-
fense. It is a mistake, however, to define the social value at the heart
of copyright solely in terms of authorial activity.
1. Meaning as Social Value
As Heymann observes, "[c]opyright is not a reward for creative
production as such; it is an incentive to ensure that the public has ac-
cess to works that would not otherwise exist." 124 Certainly, incentiviz-
ing authors to create new and derivative works can produce social
value. But social value can also be found more generally in the ac-
124. Heymann, supra note 61, at 453.
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commodation of new expression, even when the form of the work is
not new, regardless of authorial pedigree.
Wong was entirely correct to suggest that the transformativeness
inquiry should focus not on the defendant's actions or intent, but
rather on the resulting work.125 The question is not, however, whether
that resulting work evidences the type of authorial social value to be
rewarded with copyright protection. Instead, the proper inquiry is
whether the resulting work ultimately produces additional value by
"yield[ing] 'new information, new aesthetics, [or] new insights and
understandings."' 126 Ultimately, the question is whether the resulting
work "is transformative in its meaning - that is, whether the reader
perceives the second copy as signifying something different from the
first."127 Heymann summarizes the point this way:
What the fair use doctrine should be concerned with,
then, is not what an author does when she creates -
whether the second author changes the first author's
expression in some ascertainable or substantial
way - but rather whether the reader perceives an in-
terpretive distance between one copy and another (in
other words, a lack of similitude). If distinct discur-
sive communities can be identified surrounding each
copy, that fact should lead us to think that the mean-
ing of the expression has been transformed, even if
the expression itself has not.128
This suggests at least two strands to Heymann's analysis. One in-
cludes cases in which the defendant has taken affirmative steps to re-
contextualize the original work and courts assess audience
engagement and interpretation with the work as part of its transforma-
tiveness analysis.129 Blanch v. Koons is one such example, with the
court citing Koons' recontextualization as indicative of his "sharply
different" purposes in using the original, 1o and "highlighting Koons's
efforts to engage viewers in a different interpretive discourse from
that of Blanch."13 1 These cases generally fit comfortably within the
125. See supra notes 111- 116 and accompanying text.
126. Heymann, supra note 61, at 452 (second alteration in original).
127. Id. at 455.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 453.
130. 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Koons asserts - and Blanch does not deny -
that his purposes in using Blanch's image are sharply different from Blanch's goals in creat-
ing it.").
131. Heymann, supra note 61, at 461 (describing the court's approach, "which, although
still adhering to notions of authorial intent, adopted language indicating a focus on interpie-
tation").
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universe of expressive authorial activity, 132 although Heymann's work
provides an important and more constructive frame for the analysis.
The second strand is perhaps subtler. What about those cases in
which evidence of authorial purpose and activity - through physical
alteration, recontextualization, and/or change in function - is more
muddled, unconvincing, or even contradictory to transformative use?
Can audience engagement with the work matter? What if audience
interaction with and about the work triggers unexpected social re-
sponses, cultivating new and expansive cultural meanings, messages,
and insights? Does accommodating this work, as a necessary constitu-
ent of this interpretive engagement, further copyright's goal of pm-
moting the social value of new expression?
If fair use is taken seriously as a doctrine of accommodation, dis-
tinct from monopoly incentives, then the answer is yes. From this per-
spective, the courts' narrow focus on authorial purpose and activity is
misplaced. Courts should focus instead on the resulting work, not
solely as evidence of authorship, but as a potential source of social
value. That value, viewed through the goals of copyright, is realized
in the production of new expression. From the very inception of the
transformativeness inquiry, the Supreme Court has recognized the
transformative value of expression to include not just new forms, but
also new messages and meanings; as the recontextualization cases
suggest, "facilitating dissemination of multiple meanings of the same
work can achieve [the goal of copyright law] as well as the dissemina-
tion of multiple works."133
Courts have come to assume, however, that those messages and
meanings reside in the mind and intentions of the "author," that those
messages and meanings are transmitted from the author to the audi-
ence, and that certain segments of the audience either "get it" or do
not. But this paradigm misconceives the process by which "meaning"
is realized. Meaning is not controlled, transmitted, or even consistent.
It is, instead, negotiated and actualized in engagement with the audi-
ence, or, more appropriately, audiences. 34
132. It is worth noting a distinct group of cases in which, as in Blanch, the original work
is used for an entirely different purpose, but with no significant authorial activity. InBond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003), for instance, the original purpose of the work was ente-
tainment or information. The subsequent purpose was the use of that same work, entirely
without change, as evidence. Of course, these are entirely different functions, with the sub-
sequent use being non-expressive with no authorial activity. Likewise, in A. V. ex rel. Van-
derhye v. iWaradigins, LLC, the court found defendant's use to be transformative because
"iParadigms ... uses the [students' term] papers for an entirely different purpose, namely,
to prevent plagiarism and protect the students' written works from plagiarism. . . by archiv-
ing the students' works as digital code." 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009) (omission in
original) (quoting A. V v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 482 (E.D. Va. 2008)).
133. Heymann, supra note 61, at 466.
134. See ROBERT HODGE & GUNTHER KRESS, SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 12 (1988) ("Meaning
is always negotiated in the semiotic process, never simply imposed inexorably from above
by an omnipotent author through an absolute code.").
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Media studies provide a useful starting point for exploring this
idea.135 The literature offers three general conceptions of the audi-
ence: audience-as-mass, audience-as-outcome, and audience-as-
agent. 1 As a mass, "the audience is seen as a large collection of peo-
ple scattered across time and space who act autonomously."13 7 The
audience-as-outcome paradigm invokes "a 'transmission' model of
communication,"138 that conceives of people as "passive receiver[s] of
the information contained in [a] message." 139 The third conception,
audience-as-agent, characterizes audience members as "free agents
choosing what media they will consume, bringing their own interpre-
tive skills to the texts they encounter, [and] making their own mean-
ings ... ." 140 This does not mean, however, that an audience can be
scrutinized in isolation, without reference to outside influences.
Rather, audience members are both "individual agents [and] partici-
pants in the larger dynamics of social and institutional structure." 141
This audience-as-agent conception has largely come to dominate
our understanding of the engagement between reader and text.142 This
model allows us to move toward the idea that audience engagement
143can itself create social value - whether cultural, creative, political,
135. See, e.g., Victor Costello & Barbara Moore, Cultural Outlaws: An Examination of
Audience Activity and Online Television Fandom, 8 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 124, 124
(2007) ("One of the more persistent debates in mass communication research centers on the
question, Is the audience active or passive? In other words, are viewers or listeners capable
of making their own meaning out of message content or are they merely helpless victims of
media producers?" (citations omitted)).
136. See James G. Webster, The Audience, 42 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
190, 191 (1998).
137. Id. at 192 (describing the audience-as-mass as "defined as an entity by their com-
mon exposure to media").
138. Id. at 194.
139. Id. at 193 (quoting William J. McGuire, The Yale Communication and Attitude-
Change Program in the 1950s, in AMERICAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: THE
REMEMBERED HISTORY 39, 55 (Everette E. Dennis & Ellen Wartella eds., 1996)) (describ-
ing this perspective as focused on the often detrimental power of the media, and the audi-
ence as unaware of how the media is acting upon them).
140. Id. at 194.
141. Id. at 203.
142. See, e.g., Leah A. Lievrouw & Sonia Livingstone, Introduction to the Updated Stu-
dent Edition, in HANDBOOK OF NEW MEDIA: SOCIAL SHAPING AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF ICTS 5, 7 (Leah A. Lievrouw & Sonia Livingstone eds., updated student ed. 2006) ("As
the dominance of mass communications began to unravel at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, audience researchers were already seeking different terms for understanding the power
of the media- moving away from the language of effects or impacts, towards a conception
of the active audience, the diffused, embedded audience, or more broadly, towards 'new
audience studies."' (citations omitted)). It is worth noting that this conception is in accord
with Wong's view of an audience that is "no longer just a passive consumer of content but is
empowered to be an active participant and even a co-creator or collaborator." Wong, supra
note 14, at 1097.
143. Two relatively recent decisions may well suggest certain situations in which audi-
ence engagement is key to the creation of social value. In both Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003), and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th
Cir. 2007), the original purpose of plaintiffs' photographs was largely aesthetic. Defendants'
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or otherwise. Indeed, all expressive works have the potential for
meaning, but that meaning cannot be directly transmitted from author
to audience. It can only be mediated through the audience's social
context, which lies outside the author's control. This context is where
true social value is realized.
2. Transformativeness as a Social Semiotic Process
The model of the active but socially situated audience finds sig-
nificant parallels in the field of social semiotics. Like more formalistic
structural semiotics, social semiotics is a theory of the production and
interpretation of meaning. Rather than emphasizing the structure of
rigid, unchanging codes and relationships among signs, however, so-
cial semiotics is primarily about process144 - "the social aspect of
signification ... where meaning is construed as semantic value pro-
duced though culturally shared codes" 145 that are themselves formed
through social processes. Social semiotics emphasizes that signs are
resources that have the potential to be used in a social process of
meaning-making. "Meaning is not 'transmitted' to us - we actively
create it"146 through engagement with the work.
The foundations of the meaning-making process are semiotic re-
sources, defined as "the actions, materials and artifacts we use for
communicative purposes." 147 These "[s]emiotic resources have a
meaning potential, based on their past uses, and a set of affordances
based on their possible uses." 148 The sign-maker is purposeful in her
use and transformation of those semiotic resources, but their potential
for meaning is not realized in that use. It is instead "actualized in con-
crete social contexts where their use is subject to some form of semi-
subsequent use served an entirely different function than the original work, using the images
as part of an electronic search engine that facilitated users' access to the underlying work.
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. Indeed, the Perfect 10 court found
that "a search engine may be more transformative than a parody because a search engine
provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody typically has the same
entertainment purpose as the original work." Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. Here, the distinc-
tion in function was itself enough to find transformative use, even without authorial purpose
or activity, but the social value of that function hinged on audience engagement with the
copies.
144. See HODGE & KRESS, supra note 134, at 1 ("'Mainstream semiotics' emphasizes
structures and codes, at the expense of functions and social uses of semiotic systems, the
complex interrelations of semiotic systems in social practice. . . .").
145. Pamela Nilan, Applying Semiotic Analysis to Social Data in Media Studies, 1
JURNAL KOMUNIKASI MASSA 60, 67 (2007).
146. Id. at 67.
147. THEO VAN LEEUWEN, INTRODUCING SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 285 (2005).
148. Id.; see also id. at 4 (stating that the semiotic potential of a semiotic resource is its
"potential for making meaning"); id. at 273 ("Affordances ... are the potential uses of a
given object, stemming from the perceivable properties of the obiect. Because perception is
selective, depending on the needs and interests of the perceivers, different perceivers will
notice different affordances.").
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otic regime."149 From this critical perspective, social semiotics posits
a relationship between the potential of semiotic resources and rela-
tions of power, acknowledging that dominant social conventions
shape semiotic processes. Meaning is not merely intertextual. Instead,
meaning is negotiated in the discourse of interpretive communities.
The process of meaning-making at the heart of social semiotics links
that theory to a conception of transformative fair use that conceives of
the resulting work as a text with potential meanings, rather than
merely as evidence of authorial purpose or activity.
This complexity is evident in the way that social semiotic theory
represents the relationship between text, discourse, audience, authors,
and meaning:
The notion of text needs to be retained and con-
trasted to the notion of discourse as process, pre-
cisely because a text is so limited and partial an
object of analysis....
... [Social semiotics] acknowledge[s] the impor-
tance of the flow of discourse in constructing mean-
ings around texts .... Meaning is always negotiated
in the semiotic process, never simply imposed inexo-
rably from above by an omnipotent author through
an absolute code.. . . [We] cannot assume that texts
produce exactly the meanings and effects that their
authors hope for: it is precisely the struggles and
their uncertain outcomes that must be studied at the
level of social action, and their effects in the produc-
tion of meaning.150
Viewed through this social semiotic frame, the transformativeness
inquiry occurs in the context of audience interaction with and about
the work, rather than in "the meanings and effects that [its] authors
hope for."151 Social value is manifested in interpretive communities,
and through the cultivation of new and expansive cultural meanings,
messages, and insights. It is in this process of semiosis that copy-
right's commitment to the enrichment of society can be best evalu-
ated, as a distinct question apart from the creation of new authorial
rights.
Before engaging this claim through example, however, it is im-
portant to acknowledge two key limitations. First, the analysis is not
intended to address the scope of substantive rights allotted to the first
149. Id. at 285.
150. HODGE & KRESS, supra note 134, at 12.
151. Id.
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creator, but is limited to an analysis of transformative fair use of that
work by another. Second, the goal is not to supplant current concep-
tions of transformative fair use grounded in authorial purpose, proc-
ess, and activity. The social semiotic approach opens additional lines
of inquiry for determining the transformativeness of the subsequent
work, thereby supplementing, not displacing, conventional ideals of
authorship. In other words, authorial efforts and intent matter, but
even where these fall short, valuable new expression may still be pre-
sent.
Doctrinally, a social semiotic theory of transformativeness fo-
cuses on the text, not as evidence of authorship but as a potential
source of social value. A primary goal of copyright is to expand the
available body of new expression through incentive and accommoda-
tion. 152 New expression encompasses not just new and different
forms, but the cultivation of new and multiple meanings around the
same text. These new and multiple meanings are realized in audience
engagement with and about the text. An optimal theory of fair use
accommodates this process of meaning-making without cannibalizing
incentives to create the raw materials upon which fair uses draws.
As audiences engage and interact with the work, divergent and
unexpected social responses may produce a multitude of different
meanings. In these circumstances, the promotion of science and the
arts is best served by maintaining what Campbell called "the fair use
doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copy-
right."153 It is in this space that interpretive engagement and the proc-
ess of meaning-making truly occur.
This approach is also consistent with First Amendment principles,
with which modern copyright seems so often at odds.154 Although a
full exploration of the conflict is well beyond the scope of this Article,
it is sufficient to note that a significant number of fair use cases have
recognized the difficult relationship between copyright, fair use, and
the values of free expression, particularly in terms of censorship and
"the public interest in airing divergent points of view."155 As the court
in Suntrust Bank recognized, "[f]reedom of speech . .. requires the
152. See supra notes 52 58 and accompanying text.
153. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
154. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Ab-
sence of Independent First Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14
COMM. L. & POL'Y 273 (2009); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright
Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1393 (2009); cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221
(2003) (holding that, although "copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally
adequate to address" First Amendment concerns, "copyrights [are not] 'categorically im-
mune"' from First Amendment limitations (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375
(D.C. Cir. 2001))).
155. Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2565-66; see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text. Samuelson categorizes transformative uses as "free speech and free expression" fair
uses. Samuelson, supra, at 2548 55.
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preservation of a meaningful public or democratic dialogue." , This
is true whether one understands the First Amendment as protecting
political speech, promoting democracy or self-government, furthering
the search for truth, or enhancing autonomy and enabling self-
expression."157 As a primary mechanism of accommodating First
Amendment principles in copyright law, 158 fair use must be inter-
preted and applied through the lens of these principles. The central
thesis of First Amendment protection is the free flow of information,
particularly the expression of individuals and groups at the margins of
social power, against whom the threat of censorship is most acute.
Social semiotic theory recognizes that the process of meaning-
making is in many respects an exercise in power, as we struggle to
define social reality. 159 It offers a glimpse into a moment of unsettled
authority, dominance, and control, as individuals and interpretive
communities engage the work. The larger point of the theory is thus
the question of whose realities are privileged and whose are sup-
pressed. Audience engagement with a work is not entirely uncon-
strained; rather, "while texts may have certain encoded meanings,
individuals are nonetheless capable of 'negotiating' those mean-
ings."16o In this process of negotiation, both the sign-maker and the
audience are pressured by the constant limitations of dominant social
conventions regarding the meaning attendant to semiotic resources.
These dominant conventions of meaning do not, however, "negate
new [sign-]making," but rather "attempt[] to limit and constrain the
156. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001)
(quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B]
(2001)); see also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir.
2003) ("[B]ecause parody is 'a form of social and literary criticism,' it has 'socially signifi-
cant value as free speech under the First Amendment."' (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Pen-
guin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997))); Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News
Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("First Amendment protections do
not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies suc-
ceed.").
157. Tushnet, supra note 103, at 538; see also id. at 538-47 (discussing the conflict be-
tween copyright and the First Amendment).
158. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 20.
159. See Nilan, supra note 145, at 67 (asserting that social semiotics "can assist us to be-
come more aware of social reality as a construction and of the roles played by ourselves and
others in constructing it").
160. Webster, supra note 136, at 197 (citing Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding, in
CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE 107 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1980)).
161. See GUNTHER KRESS & THEO VAN LEEUWEN, READING IMAGES: THE GRAMMAR
OF VISUAL DESIGN 12 (2d ed. 2006) ("The effect of convention is to place the pressure of
constant limitations of conformity on sign-making; that is, the way signifiers have been
combined with signifieds in the history of the culture, acts as a constantly present constraint
on how far one might move in combining signifiers with signifieds."). Of course, it takes
work to create meaning outside of dominant conventions- work by the sign-maker and by
the audience, laboring in opposition to and rejection of social convention. This suggests a
certain connection between the process of meaning-making and dominant natural law and
Lockean theories of authorship-as-labor.
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semiotic scope of [new] combinations."162 It is implicit in the social
semiotic model that social conventions made by people can be
changed by people; however, these processes are governed by social
relations of power,16 3 and "[t]o be able to change rules you need
power." 164
Tying fair use to First Amendment jurisprudence undoubtedly
carries its own pitfalls. At the very least, however, values of free
expression embrace the freedom to participate in shaping culture. This
participation is not limited to dissent, commentary, and criticism, al-
though these are certainly valued. It is, as Suntrust Bank suggests, the
value of the dialogue itself Social semiotics further recognizes that
constraints on the process of making meaning are manifestations of
the power relations embedded in expressive communication. By pm-
viding "breathing space" for that process, fair use facilitates the value
of expressive dialogue by recognizing the social value of marginalized
expression.
3. Example: Fairey v. Associated Press
In 2008, Shepard Fairey created two posters for the Obama cam-
paign, Obama Progress and Obama Hope (together, the "posters"),
each a variation on a single image. Fairey used a reference photo in
creating the image, a photo later determined to have been taken by
Mannie Garcia at a 2006 National Press Club event. 1 Garcia was
hired by The Associated Press ("The AP") to photograph the event,
and The AP claimed copyright in the photo. 169 When The AP con-
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. VAN LEELWEN, supra note 147, at 48.
165. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 103, at 560 ("[T]he risk is that courts and others may
conclude that fair use doesn't protect anything more than the First Amendment requires.").
166. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263-65 (11th Cir.
2001); see also Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559,
562 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that added weight should be given to the defendant's claim of
fair use because it was directly related to defendant organization's "First Amendment
speech rights to comment on public issues and to petition the government regarding legisla-
tion"). In National Rifle Ass n, the court went on to explain that "[defendant]'s use of the
list, if it did anything, helped create a market for [plaintiff], as citizens on one side of a
controversial issue presumably feel more need to engage in political activity if citizens on
the other side of the issue are active."Id.
167. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 4.
168. Id. at 1, 7; see also Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
451, 452-56 (2009) (discussing the lawsuit); Jo-Na Williams, The New, Symbol of "Hope"
for Fair Use: Shepard Fairey v. The Associated Press, LANDSLIDE, September/October
2009, at 55, 55-56 (2009). The reference photograph was one of Obama and actor George
Clooney. Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
169. Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 9. It should be noted that Garcia initially disputed the
ownership of rights in the photograph, arguing that he was not an AP employee and that the
photograph was not a work for hire. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervenor
Mannie Garcia's Motion to Intervene at 1 2, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123
No. 2] 367
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tacted Fairey claiming both ownership and infringement, he refused
The AP's demand to pay both a licensing fee and a royalty on reve-
nues associated with the posters.1 0 Instead, Fairey filed a declaratory
judgment action against The AP, seeking a finding of fair use and in-
junctive relief.171 The heart of Fairey's fair use claim was his assertion
of transformative use of the Garcia photo1 72 which "altered the origi-
nal with new meaning, new expression, and new messages."173 Fairey
also claimed to have altered the purpose of the work, moving from a
work intended to document events to a work intended "to inspire,
convince and convey the power of Obama's ideals, as well as his po-
tential as a leader, through graphic metaphor." 174
The AP filed counterclaims against Fairey alleging, inter alia,
copyright infringement. The AP alleged that Fairey copied the "dis-
tinctive characteristics [of Garcia's photo] in their entirety ... without
any credit to The AP."176 Refusing to acknowledge that Fairey made
any artistic contribution to Garcia's photo, The AP characterized
Fairey's work as "a form of computerized 'paint by numbers."'177 The
AP also alleged that the Garcia photo and the Fairey image "serve
exactly the same character and purpose . .. in communicating ...
evocative themes."17 8 Finally, The AP condemned Fairey's unap-
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009). Garcia later abandoned that claim. See Randy Kennedy, Photogra-
pher Withdraws Lawsuit in Shepard Fairey Case, N.Y. TIMES ARTS BEAT: THE CULTURE
AT LARGE, August 23, 2010, available at http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
08/23/photographer-withdraws-lawsuit-in-shepard-fairey-case. Others have noted that the
romantic conception of authorship appears incongruent with the work-for-hire doctrine,
under which "the firm or individual who paid to have a work created, rather than the person
who created it, is regarded as the 'author' for purposes of copyright ownership." Peter Jaszi,
Toward a Theory ofCopyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 Duke L.J. 455,
485 (1991) (noting that "it is somewhat surprising to encounter the individualistic Romantic
conception of 'authorship' deployed to support a regime [the work-for-hire doctrine] that
disassociates creative workers from a legal interest in their creations"). In this way, the
transformativeness inquiry regards authorship as a romantic concept distinct from that of
ownership.
170. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 9.
171. Id. at 10-11.
172. Id. at 4-5 ("Fairey transformed the literal depiction contained in the Garcia Photo-
graph into a stunning, abstracted and idealized visual image that creates powerful new
meaning and conveys a radically different message that has no analogue in the original
photograph.").
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id. at 5.
175. See Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, The Associated
Press at 10, 37, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009)
[hereinafter Answer].
176. Id. at 37; see also id. at 10. Interestingly, "Garcia admitted that he did not recognize
his photograph of Obama as the photograph Fairey referenced to create his works." Answer,
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants at 20,
Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).
177. Answer, supra note 175, at 38.
178. Id. The AP also alleged that Fairey's work "cannot be characterized as commenting
on or criticizing the Obama Photo." Id.
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proved use of the Garcia photo as "utter disregard of The AP's long-
established licensing program." 179
Both Fairey's transformativeness claim and The AP's opposing
arguments proceeded along familiar routes, focusing on authorial pur-
pose or activity, including physical alteration of the original work. A
social semiotic analysis of transformativeness would, as described
above, take an entirely different perspective. The point of inquiry
shifts to the resulting works - here, the posters - as potential
sources of social value in the production and interpretation of new
meanings and messages. In making this assessment, the focus is on
engagement, both with and about the work. This engagement is a
process of negotiation in which meanings are constructed in the con-
text of social practice and convention. The remainder of this section
undertakes an analysis of that social semiotic process, looking at (a)
the work, (b) the semiotic resources represented in the work, (c) the
motivations of the sign-maker, (d) the discourse and negotiation tak-
ing place around the work in various interpretive communities, and (e)
the role of social convention and power in this process. This analysis
is then applied to the transformativeness inquiry.
A. The Work
According to Fairey, the posters were created using Garcia's pho-
tograph as a "visual reference."18 0 Unlike the Garcia photograph,
Fairey's posters depict a tightly cropped Obama as the sole repre-
sented participant.18 1 Obama is seen from a low angle, with the degree
of elevation somewhat exaggerated by close proximity. 182 He is look-
ing to his left, slightly up and off into the distance at someone or
something out of the frame.183 This has the effect of elevating
Obama's chin. Obama appears serious, perhaps as though he is listen-
ing. His eyes are slightly narrowed, as though focusing. 184
Fairey's posters are composed using bright, primary colors.185
Red, white, and blue (in two shades) are used to create both vertical
and horizontal divisions. 1 The image incorporates geometric shapes
in the design, some more explicit and others more abstract. 18 A one-
word slogan- either "HOPE" or "PROGRESS"- appears at the
bottom of each poster.188
179. Id. at 12-14.
180. Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
181. See id. at Ex. A (the Garcia photograph); id. at Ex. B-C (the posters).
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B. Semiotic Resources Represented in the Work
Fairey's catalog is intended to be subversive, not only in imagery,
but also in medium (e.g., graffiti, posters, stickers, etc.) and the envi-
ronment in which his art is encountered. 189 Fairey's use of bold colors
and striking geometric shapes is likely to draw attention in the
crowded streets where his work has appeared. 190 He re-appropriates
and manipulates iconic images. 19 1 His work is also intended to be
mass-produced. 192
The Fairey posters draw aesthetically from the Constructivist
movement in Russia between 1919 and the mid to late 1930s.193 Con-
structivism was overtly political, rejecting the concept of art for art's
sake in favor of a functional, utilitarian conception of art for social
purposes. 194 Constructivism tends toward angular, geometric design
elements, bold and bright colors, and thick lettering. The second read-
ily identifiable influence is the Bauhaus school, which was itself in-
fluenced both by Constructivism and the Dutch artistic movement
known as De Stijl. 195 De Stijl emphasized the use of straight lines,
horizontal/vertical orientations, the use of geometric shapes and pri-
mary colors, and the combination of oppositional elements. Ameri-
cans were exposed to Bauhaus-influenced designs in the 1930s and
189. Id. at 2 (describing Fairey's work); id. at 3 ("A large body of Fairey's work ques-
tions and criticizes Presidents, politicians and world leaders, past and present."); id. (de-
scribing his "Obey" campaign as work that "urges the observer to question obedience to
social commands and the political status quo"); id. ("The content of Fairey's work is a call
to action about hierarchies and abuses of power, politics and the commodification of cul-
ture."); see also Robert L. Pincus, Social Ferment Not Always Reflected in Fermentation of
Artworks, SIGN ON SAN DIEGO, Dec. 30, 2007, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/
features/20071230-9999-mzla30art.html (describing a Fairey work in which "traffic signs,
buildings and the like were plastered with his image of Andre the Giant").
190. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 2 (describing Fairey's "street art"); Steven Heller,
Beyond Red, White and Blue, CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Feb. 15, 2008, 6:58 PM),
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/15/beyond-red-white-and-blue
("[A]lternative graphic approaches are decidedly more eye-catching and that can't help but
have a positive public impact."); Pincus, supra note 189.
191. Complaint, supra note 1, at 3 ("Fairey is committed to creating work that has mean-
ing for his audience - by using familiar cultural iconography that people can relate to and
by constantly bringing his work into the public sphere.").
192. See Colin Gleadell, Shepard Fairey s Obama Comes to London, THE TELEGRAPH,
Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/4291504/Shepard-Faireys-Obama-
comes-to-London.html (describing the mass production of Fairey's work).
193. Ken Johnson, Can a Rebel Stay a Rebel Without the Claws?, N.Y. TIMES, March
18, 2008, at Cl. See generally STEVEN A. SEIDMAN, POSTERS, PROPAGANDA, AND
PERSUASION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AROUND THE WORLD AND THROUGH HISTORY 20
(2008) (discussing the influence of the Bauhaus school and Constructivism on graphic de-
sign generally and political posters more specifically).
194. Liz DAWTREY ET AL., INVESTIGATING MODERN ART 175 (1996).
195. See generally PAM MEECHAM & JULIE SHELDON, MODERN ART: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 120-122 (2000) (discussing Constructivism, Bauhaus and De Stil, as well
as the relationship between them).
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early 1940s through the Federal Art Project of the Works Pm-
gress/Work Projects Administration.196
In addition to the aesthetic design elements just described, the im-
age of Obama in Fairey's posters invokes the depiction of Soviet,
Chinese, and German leaders from early to mid-twentieth century
propaganda posters. 197 There are, however, clear distinctions. For in-
stance, posters of Stalin often depict him in a specific posture and
were not cropped as closely as Fairey's posters.198 Unlike Fairey's
posters, in which Obama appears alone, posters of Stalin often include
"the masses." 199 Mao has been depicted as proximate to the viewer,
and occasionally made to appear as though hovering over earthen
landscapes or crowds of small people.200 Many Mao posters are hori-
zontally oriented to capture this landscape effect.201 While Mao, like
Fairey's depiction of Obama, is often pictured from a low, oblique-
angle perspective, he is often looking directly at the viewer and smil-
ing. Finally, Mao has been depicted as framed by the sun, with
beams of light radiating from his countenance.203 Hitler was often
portrayed from a greater distance, but with head and body positions
similar to the Obama posters. 204
The Fairey posters also draw on elements found in many domes-
tic campaign posters. As in the Fairey posters, U.S. presidential can-
didates have often been presented as the sole participant with his face
in close proximity to the viewer.205 Moreover, in many posters,
196. See generally COLIN MOORE, PROPAGANDA PRINTS: A HISTORY OF ART IN THE
SERVICE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE 131-136 (2010) (describing evolving aesthet-
ics from Bauhaus to the Works Progress/Work Projects Administration and highlighting the
prominent role of certain Bauhaus-trained artists).
197. See Miranda Siegel, A Look at Art for Obama iwith Shepard Fairey, NEW YORK
MAG. (Oct. 1, 2009, 4:26 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2009/10/obama art.html.
198. See, e.g., Stalin Posters, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/
sets/72157625192566084 (last visited May 6, 2011).
199. See VICTORIA E. BONNELL, ICONOGRAPHY OF POWER: SOVIET POLITICAL POSTERS
UNDER LENIN AND STALIN 163 (1997) (noting that "[c]ritics... devoted a good deal of
attention to" the issue of "Stalin's relationship to the masses" in these posters). In one re-
view, a critic took the artists to task for showing Stalin "full-face ... held aloft by five
arms" with "[f]lags and industrial scenes fill[ing] the background." Id. at 164. The critic
stated: "In order to show Comrade Stalin as the vozhd' of the masses, as the genius leader,
as the active participant in socialist construction. . ., the artists raise him above the masses
and juxtapose them. The masses are deprived of class character, depersonalized in the direct
sense of the word . . . ." Id.
200. See, e.g., Mao Posters, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494 aNO2
/sets/72157625067659005 (last visited May 6, 2011).
201. See, e.g., id.
202. See, e.g., id.
203. See, e.g., id.
204. See, e.g., Hitler Posters, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494 aNO2/
sets/72157625192567940 (last visited May 6, 2011).
205. SEIDMAN, supra note 193, at 242 ("Most modern election posters ... have followed
this simple format: a photograph of a smiling candidate, a slogan, and a party's logo."); See,
e.g., id. at 9 (McClellan); 40 (Lincoln); 58 (Hoover); 74 (Nixon, Lodge); 85 (Carter); see
No. 2] 371
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American presidential candidates are seen from a low, oblique angle,
often with the chin slightly elevated.206 The subject is often portrayed
in three-quarters profile, looking slightly up and off into the distance
at someone or something out of the frame.207 Although the aesthetic
composition of U.S. campaign posters is generally more varied, depic-
tions of presidential candidates have utilized elements similar to those
found in propaganda pieces featuring Stalin, Mao, and Hitler. These
include the use of bright, primary colors to resemble a colorized pho-
tograph, and the use of color and geometric shapes to create vertical
and horizontal divisions.208 Depictions of other candidates have incor-
porated elements that, although not incorporated in the Obama poster,
have clear reference in the Soviet, Chinese, and German propaganda
posters. 209
The commonalities of these compositions are unsurprising in the
context of a presidential campaign. Low angles are said to make the
subject "look imposing and awesome" by "giv[ing] an impression of
superiority, exaltation and triumph."210 Oblique angles create a sense
of other-worldliness.211 Proximity has religious overtones, serving "a
dramatic function, allowing the subtlest of emotional relationships
with a minimum of dramatic scenery." 212 This relationship between
subject and viewer is reinforced by the unsmiling expression indica-
tive of a "demand" image "that realize[s] a particular social rela-
tion."213 These characteristics establish a certain type of charismatic
authority.
also Presidential Campaign Posters (Historical), FLICKR, http://www.flickr
.com/photos/51369494aNO2/sets/72157625184240834 (last visited May 6, 2011).
206. See, e.g., id.; see also SEIDMAN, supra note 193, at 8 (describing "a 1976 U.S. elec-
tion poster for the reelection campaign of President Gerald Ford, which used a photograph
of Ford, shot from below, so that viewers would perceive him as more imposing").
207. See SEIDMAN, supra note 193, at 83 (describing poster images of Kennedy and
McGovern in profile, but recognizing this as somewhat atypical);
208. See, e.g., Presidential Campaign Posters (Historical), FLICKR http://www.flickr
.com/photos/51369494aNO2/sets/72157625184240834 (last visited May 6, 2011).
209. See, e.g., John McCain Campaign Poster, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/
photos/51369494aNO2/5090106525/in/set-72157625184240834 (last visited May 6, 2011)
(depicting an oversized image of McCain's head, floating in the sky, with
his face illuminated and illuminating the clouds around him); Richard Nixon
Campaign Poster, FLICKR http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/5090702860/in!
set-72157625184240834 (last visited May 6, 2011) (utilizing bold colors in an image of
Nixon surrounded by, but separate from, a large crowd of advisers, celebrities, and citizens);
Ronald Reagan Campaign Poster, FLICKR http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@_NO2/5090702918/in/set-72157625184240834 (last visited May 6, 2011) (im-
posing the candidate's larger-than-life image over a landscape of American icons, linking
him to the national mythology); Wendell Willkie Campaign Souvenir, FLICKR,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/5090106391/in/set-72157625184240834
(last visited May 6, 2011) (using a design strikingly reminiscent of the beams of radiating
light used in images of Mao).
210. KRESS & VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 161, at 140.
211. See id. at 136.
212. Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id. at 123.
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C. Motivations of the Sign-Maker
Fairey's interest in the object (then-candidate Obama) guided his
selection of criterial aspects - young, smart, hip, progressive. Ac-
cording to Fairey, the posters were "designed to capture the optimism
and inspiration created by Obama's candidacy." 2 14 Presumably, the
aesthetic forms Fairey chose to signify these aspects are those that he
considered apt for the intended meaning. Here, Fairey chose the aes-
thetic of communist chic, although he might not term it as such.
Like Andy Warhol and many of the other pop artists preceding
him, Fairey takes existing and often iconic semiotic resources and
places them in a different context to create new meanings.215 His work
includes elements of "Soviet-era propaganda, paintings from Works
Progress Administration campaigns, and '60s-era psychedelic rock
poster art."216 His use of these symbols is intended to be ironic, rather
than traditionally political.217
In Fairey's social context - that of a pop artist, inspired by oth-
ers who have used such symbols, moving in a network of others who
comprehend those symbols in a similar way - these symbols, ele-
ments, and aesthetics are available to create meaning. Fairey does not
revere traditional cultural symbols as static or unassailable, but rather
treats them as elements with which to play. Fairey does not reject
capitalism, but rather refines and reconfigures it in the context of
other interests and values.218 Similarly, in Fairey's Obama posters,
"[b]y evoking stylized propaganda posters more often associated with
autocrats and dictators, Fairey at once portrays the inevitability of
214. Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
215. See, e.g., John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual
Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 108-111 (1988) (discussing pop artists'
appropriation and recontextualization of ordinary and iconic objects as semiotic resources).
216. Geoff Edgers, Shepard the Giant, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2009, at Ni; see
also Melena Ryzik, Closer to Mainstream, Still a Bit Rebellious, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008,
at El, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/arts/design/02fair.html (noting that
Fairey, who admits to the label "pop artist," "has always toyed with ideas of commercial-
ism, advertising and appropriation").
217. Fairey claims to reject the underlying subversive politics of the symbols he uses as
reference material:
I'm very much an integrationist and I believe that creative people that
are maybe somewhat more radical still need to work within what's
realistic, not pie-in-the-sky, "Yeah, let's rip it all down!" Look at the
people who do that, like Castro and Che Guevara: They failed. Lenin
failed. But I'm about working within capitalism even though I'm cri-
tiquing it and working within our two-party system of democracy but
trying to make it better. I think people get the wrong idea sometimes;
they think that if you've got some complaint that you're anti-
everything. I'm definitely not. I'd be a hypocrite to sell art work if I
was anti-capitalist.
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Obama's triumph, while suggesting qualities of wisdom and vision
that pull viewers willingly into Obama's message of hope, progress
and change."2 19 Fairey intended the work in question to represent the
"visual embodiment of the unprecedented grassroots support Obama
had harnessed." 220
D. Discourse, Negotiation, and Interpretive Communities
As various interpretive communities encountered the posters as
contextual texts, they drew on semiotic resources, and the divergent
flows of discourse around those texts produced multiple distinct and
often contradictory meanings and effects. For Fairey and others -
those interpretive communities sharing similar semiotic regimes -
the aesthetic of the poster was interpreted through social conventions
of the young, smart, and hip. In this context, the semiotic resources
available to interpret the text were drawn from pop artists such as
Warhol, whose work has been described as commenting on the "re-
lentless victory of Capitalism" over communism.221 In this social con-
text, the allusion to socialist, communist, and fascist dictators was not
serious; it was radical, ironic, and idealistic, and distinctly not anti-
capitalist.222
Reaction within other interpretive communities was quite differ-
ent, and two distinct themes were dominant. The first accused
Fairey's posters of invoking the imagery of socialism, communism,
and/or fascism.223 This theme encompassed at least three underlying
219. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.
220. Id. at 6; see also id. at 1 (describing the works as "powerful symbols of Obama's
grassroots support").
221. Auction listing for Andy Warhol's Hammer and Sickle, CHRISTIE'S,
http://www.christies.com/LotFinder/lot-details.aspx?intObljectlD=4978852 (click on "Lot
Notes") (last visited May 6, 2011). In Warhol's appropriation of communist symbols, "the
world of commerce has taken the apparatus of its adversary, absorbed it and turned it
against itself" Id. Fairey acknowledges similar influences. See SEIDMAN, supra, note 193.
222. See id. see also Del Signore, supra note 217.
223. See, e.g., Press Release, Lawrence Graham Williams III, Independent Art Historian,
Obama's Public Image Speaks Volumes (Sept. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.lgwilliams.com/art/Obama Public_1mageSpeaksVolumes.pdf ("Obama's
2008 Presidential poster actually conveys, to the learned viewer, an arbitrary red, white and
blue fagade placed over an old Communist authority.. . . [U]nderlying this familiar face one
can also recognize the template of political ruthlessness, suppressed freedoms, and an un-
compromising authoritarian."); Shawn D. Akers, Obama s Henchmen and the Rise of
Commufascism, BROOKESNEwS (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.brookesnews.com/
081310obamacensorship.html ("[S]cattered around the nation are tri-color campaign posters
of Mr. Obama, bearing a striking resemblance to the larger than life representations of
Lenin, Marx, and Engels used by soviet propagandists in the glory days of Mother Rus-
sia."); Peggy Shapiro, Obama 's Posters: Message in the Image, AM. THINKER
(Apr. 15, 2008), htp://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2008/04/obamasspostersmessage
in the.html ("[The poster] image appropriates the graphic style of totalitarian Soviet propa-
ganda. It recalls the idealized portraits and personality cult of the 'Beloved Leader' such as
Stalin and Lenin.").
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concerns: the imposition of an alternate, non-capitalist economic sys-
tem; the rise of a dominant, totalitarian government that would
threaten basic liberties; and the elevation of Obama as a leader of cult-
like status. 224 The second theme, in some ways related to the first,
accused Obama and his supporters of equating him to the messiah or a
messiah-like figure.225
The variation in these reactions can be explained in part by differ-
ences in semiotic conventions. Each of these interpretive communi-
ties, negotiating against the needs and interests of that community,
developed social conventions regarding the meaning of semiotic re-
sources employed in the Fairey posters. As the various communities
encountered the posters as a collection of semiotic resources with po-
tential meanings, and engaged in discourse with and about those
works, the process of meaning-making occurred in the context of that
community's dominant semiotic regime. The results were quite dis-
tinct.
In order to conceptualize these varied and distinct semiotic re-
gimes, and the role of these dominant conventions on the interpreta-
tion of the Fairey posters, it may be helpful to take a broader look at
how some other communities - communities quite different from
that inhabited by Shepard Fairey - had come to regard the use of
Eastern Bloc aesthetics in art and fashion. Take, for instance, the revi-
talization of "Soviet chic," "communist chic," and the resurgent "cult
of Che" 226 that occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many con-
servatives, particularly those tending toward libertarianism, were in-
tensely critical, terming it a foolish trend among Hollywood elites,
224. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 223; Akers, supra note 223; Shapiro, supra note 223
("What is then unsettling about the Obama poster campaign is that it may be perfectly suited
for a man whose candidacy is based on a personality cult. . . .").
225. See, e.g., Warner Todd Huston, Obaa 's Propagandistic Iconography: The Making
of a Messiah, NEWSBUSTERS (June 22, 2008, 2:45 PM), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/
warner-todd-huston/2008/06/22/obamas-propagandistic-iconography-making-messiah (re-
ferring to Fairey's work as "[t]he overblown, obscenely reverential posters featuring
Obama's upturned face in Jesus-like poses" and noting that "[o]ne has but to view a few
communist posters meant to keep the people reminded of the god-like status of their com-
munist dictators and oppressors to see the stunning similarity that the Obama posters reveal
with their communist progenitors"); Gary C. Lawrence, Messiah Chic in the White House,
MERIDIAN (Apr. 27, 2009) (on file with author) (discussing "[t]he halos and streaming rays
of sunlight emanating from Obama's chin-forward visage, first in pop art, then campaign
posters, and then on the covers of magazines" and "[t]he ubiquitous pictures from low cam-
era angles looking upward into his face"); Shapiro, supra note 223 (describing the posters as
depicting "[t]he leader, face illuminated by a 'holy' light, [who] looks off to the horizon and
sees the truth that is not available to his mere mortal followers, who must look up to his
image").
226. The so-called "cult of Che" is not a new phenomenon. In 1968, shortly after Che
Guevara's execution by Bolivian soldiers, Time published an article with that title, deriding
students wearing Che-style berets and "[h]andkerchiefs, sweatshirts and blouses decorated
with his shaggy countenance" as "a new source of profits for composers, poster makers and
book publishers." The Cult of Che, TIME, May 17, 1968, at 46, 46, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,838357- 1,00.html.
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urban hipsters, and privileged college students.227 The growing popu-
larity of the KGB Bar in New York was a particular point of conflict,
as the conservative press ridiculed not only the bar, but the complicity
of elite intellectuals and of The New York Times in promoting the
venue's popularity. 228
Although it is unclear whether the elites and hipsters were aware
of the change, the skirmish took on a more serious tone around the
turn of the century, during the first term of George W. Bush after 9/11
and the invocation of the axis of evil,229 during the revitalization of
Russia under Putin,230 and around the time of Reagan's death.231
David Horowitz conducted a campus campaign against dangerous
liberal professors.232 The Weekly Standard warned that "what starts as
Commie chic easily grows into full-fledged intellectual Stalinism."233
Nevertheless, by 2004, the elements of communist chic were a force
in fashion, art, music, and intellectual discourse, both in the United
States and Europe. In Europe, the 2003 release of the film Goodbye,
Lenin! became "a cult sensation, rejuvenating the retro, Communist-
chic style among East and West Germans." 234 The largest exhibit of
227. See, e.g., Stephen Marche, Some Straight Talk on China, THESTAR.COM, Apr. 12,
2008, http://www.thestar.com/News/Ideas/article/413767 (identifying the primary adherents
of communist chic as privileged college students and lefty professors, "teenagers who have
read too much and not enough," and Hollywood elites like Cameron Diaz, who was vilified
for wearing a handbag with Maoist slogans while touring Macchu Picchu).
228. John Wilson, Communist Chic: Hoisting a Feiw' to the Ghost of Stalin, WEEKLY
STANDARD, February 15, 1999, at 38 (discussing a review of the KGB Bar that appeared in
the New, York Times, and noting that "the Ku Klux Klan, like Nazism, is still beyond the
pale, but the Soviets (the Times explains with a wink and a nudge) are just dangerous
enough to be fun").
229. See David E. Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. Is Top Prior-
ity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/
01/30/us/state-union-overview-bush-focusing-terrorism-says-secure-us-top-priority.html
(discussing President Bush's first invocation of the "axis of evil" concept).
230. See generally Marshall 1. Goldman & Joanne J. Myers, Petrostate: Putin, Power,
and the New, Russia, CARNEGIE COUNCIL, June 4, 2008, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/
resources/transcripts/0047.html (interview discussing the rise ofPutin from 1999 to 2008).
23 1. See generally Marilyn Berger, Ronald Reagan Dies at 93: Fostered Cold-War Might
and Curbs on Government, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2004, at 1, available at http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9AO4EODAl 13 1F935A35755COA9629C8B63.
232. See generally DAVID HOROWITZ, THE PROFESSORS: THE 101 MOST DANGEROUS
ACADEMICS IN AMERICA (2006).
233. Wilson, supra note 228, at 38-39. Wilson also observes:
It is easy to see how this happens. American intellectuals still
reserve their highest accolades for the "subversive," and the best way
to get noticed is still to take a truism and invert it. So, after the melt-
down of the Soviet Union, the hip move is to propose an intellectual
history in which the prescient thinkers, the ones on whom we should
model ourselves, are Communists.
Id. at 38.
234. Nora Fitzgerald, Berlin s Wall Is Down, but Try To Keep Mom from Finding Out,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at El, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/02/movies/
berlin-s-wall-is-down-but-try-to-keep-mom-from-finding-out.html.
Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis
East German art to date followed shortly thereafter in Berlin.235 In
2005, a Newsweek article observed: "Eastern Europe is the new cool
in the same downbeat intellectual subculture way that Paris in the
1950s gave us existentialism and the black turtleneck, that kind of
coffeehouse undercurrent that is the antithesis of the establish-
ment." 236
All the while, discourse in the conservative and libertarian com-
munity grew more critical, even angry. 237 Communist chic aesthetics
were linked to intellectualism, academia, elitism, arrogance, and cer-
tain conceptions of class distinction, primarily based on education.238
National Review criticized liberals for romanticizing Guevara.239 Lib-
ertarian commentator Radley Balko admitted, "I just wanna' smack
'em a few times."240
A second strand of conservatism, what Bill O'Reilly calls the
"Culture Warriors," sounded a similar theme.241 As further explained
on O'Reilly's website, "America is in the midst of a fierce culture war
between those who embrace traditional values and those who want to
change America into a 'secular-progressive' country." 242 Populists
like Lou Dobbs echoed much of this sentiment, setting "government,
235. See East German Art Retrospective Sparks Debate, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 27,
2003), htp://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/O,,934779,00.html; see also Nora Fitzgerald,
Artifacts of Uberkitsch Evoke Old East Germany; High and Lou Culture Offer Powierful
Reminders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at El, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/
01/arts/artifacts-uberkitsch-evoke-old-east-germany-high-low-culture-offer-powerful.html.
236. Ginanne Brownell, Coining Fashion, NEWSWEEK (ATLANTIC EDITION), Sept. 12,
2005, at 60 (quoting David Wolfe, creative director of trend-forecasting company The
Donegar Group). Much of the press found this trend "ironic," "retro-groovy," and "amus-
ing." See, e.g., Geoff Collett, Posters Recall Cult of Mao, THE PRESS (CHRISTCHURCH),
Apr. 23, 2007, at 7.
237. See, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Op-Ed., Communist Chic, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at
E9, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/articles/2006/
04/30/communist chic. (attacking "totalitarian fashion")
238. A 2009 article by Stephen Marche remarked:
[I]t's unlikely that all the pseudo-hipsters who buy their Che T-shirts
at Urban Outfitters will stop wearing them. No. These T-shirts send a
message, which effectively boils down to this: I have vague left-wing
sympathies but don't read history. I am educated enough to want
nonconformity but not intelligent enough to avoid conformity. I be-
lieve in supporting the wretched of the earth but happily purchase
products from multinational corporations.
Stephen Marche, What's So Bad About Socialism, Anyway?, ESQUIRE, Feb. 2009, at 50,
available at http://www.esquire.com/features/thousand-words-on-culture/obama-socialist-
connections-0209.
239. See Jay Nordlinger, Che Chic, NAT'L REv., December 31, 2004, at 28.
240. Radley Balko, Soviet Chic, THE AGITATOR (Aug. 30, 2004, 11:12 AM),
http://www.theagitator.com/2004/08/30/soviet-chic ("[T]here's something really aggravat-
ing about these middle class kids born into the most privileged conditions in all of human
history suddenly finding it trendy to carry water for a belief system that murdered hundreds
of millions of people, and enslaved billions more.").
241. See Culture Warrior, BILL 0' REILLY, http://www.billoreilly.com/culturewarrior
(last visited May 6, 2011).
242. Id.
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big business, and special interests" against the American Dream.243
The imagery is fierce and warlike.
Many with libertarian leanings interpreted the aesthetic through
conventions of counter-revolution: naYvet6, intellectualism, elitism,
arrogance, and certain conceptions of class distinction.244 The semi-
otic resources employed were interpreted as metaphors for alternative
forms of governance and economic organization. 245 The dominant
convention was to see communist chic as truly dangerous, a real call
to political conversion.246 The dominant meaning was not that Obama
was cool, or hip, but rather that the Obama movement was actually
dangerous as a threat to capitalist culture.
Culture warriors seemed to pick up the communist/socialist con-
vention proffered by the Libertarians and then mold or extrapolate its
meaning according to the conventions of their social context: tradi-
tional but fading power and homogeneous values and beliefs. Accord-
ing to this group, the central threat of communism/socialism was
godlessness. The Fairey posters were said to portray Obama as a mes-
siah-like false god.247 This interpretation both emerged from and fed
into several dominant, politically charged narratives about Obama's
identity: Obama the Muslim;248 Obama the black liberation theolo-
gist;249 Obama the foreign-born candidate;250 Obama the mixed-race
child;251 and Obama the terrorist sympathizer.252
243. See, e.g., LOu DOBBS, WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS: HOW THE GOVERNMENT, BIG
BUSINESS, AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS ARE WAGING WAR ON THE AMERICAN DREAM
AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK 12 (2006).
244. See supra notes 238-243, and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 226-228.
246. See supra notes 227 228.
247. See, e.g., Huston, supra note 225 (drawing a link between Fairey's invocation of
"the graphic tradition of communist propaganda," various leaders' desire for "god-like
status," and an attempt by the Obama campaign to "turn[] Barack Obama from mere politi-
cian to religious icon").
248. See, e.g., Lauren Green, Nearly ] in 5 Americans Thinks Obama Is Muslim, Survey
Shows, Fox NEWS.COM (Aug. 19, 2010), hftp://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/08/19/
nearly-americans-thinks-obama-muslim-survey-shows.
249. See, e.g., Ed Sherwood, Obama and Black Liberation Theology, WASH. TIMES, May
2, 2008, at A23, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/
may/2/obama-and-black-liberation-theology; cf Jeremiah Wright Graphic with "DAMN"
Caption, FLICKR, hftp://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/5090697046/in/set-
72157625059444405 (last visited May 6, 2011); Obama Graphic with "RACIST"
Caption, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/5090101901/in/set-
72157625059444405 (last visited May 6, 2011).
250. See, e.g., Michael Mello, Buena Park Pastor Files Suit to Keep Obamafrom Taking
Office, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.ocregister.com/news/obama-
103280-drake-evidence.html.
251. See, e.g., Shelby Steele, The Identity Card, TIME (Nov. 30, 2007)
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1689619,00.html; see also Obama
Graphic with "TAUPE" Caption, FLICKR, htp://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494 aNO2/
5090101957/in/set-72157625059444405 (last visited May 6, 2011).
252. See, e.g., Pamela Geller, Obaa 's Ties to Funding Terrorists, RIGHT WING NEWS
(Mar. 24, 2008, 10:39 AM), http://rightwingnews.com/mt331/2008/03/obamas ties to
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This discourse highlights the struggle and uncertainty surrounding
the employment of these particular semiotic resources. As discussed
previously, the Fairey posters draw upon certain elements that consis-
tently appear in portrayals of U.S. presidential candidates.253 Compar-
ing these portrayals side-by-side with the Obama image, the
similarities are striking. Indeed, Fairey indicated that part of his pur-
pose in creating the image was to convey Obama's potential as a
leader. 254 In many interpretive communities, however, the discourse
either ignored or rejected past uses of these elements in favor of a dif-
ferent semiotic regime. The semiotic text, once released into a multi-
tude of social contexts, was out of the author's control. In many of
these contexts, the author's desired meanings were not missed by the
audience but simply rejected.
E. Social Convention and Power
There is remarkable evidence here of the struggle for power
through control of social convention. The Fairey posters themselves
served as raw material for countless mash-ups by supporters and de-
tractors.255 Obama is variously portrayed as a Communist or Social-
ist,256 as Hitler257 or Che,258 as a false messiah,259 as a fraud,260 or as a
snob.261 Other propaganda posters superimposed Obama's face on
iconic posters from the Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Nazi Ger-
funding terrori _lphp; see also Obama Graphic with "ARAB" Caption, FLICKR,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/5090101873/in/set-72157625059444405
(last visited May 6, 2011); Obama Graphic with "SHARIA" Caption, FLICKR,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/5090699856/in/set-72157625059444405
(last visited May 6, 2011).
253. See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 174, 214, and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Bianca Bartz, Political Parodies: Bush Vs. Obama: DOPE Parodies
HOPE, TRENDHUNTER (May 7, 2008), http://www.trendhunter.com/trends/bush-obama-
dope-hope (collecting derivatives of the original Hope poster); Spoofing Shepard Fairey 's
Obaina "Hope" Posters, VILLAGE VOICE, hftp://www.villagevoice.com/slideshow/
spoofing-shepard-faireys-obama-hope-posters-165211 (last visited May 6, 2011)
(same);.Rene Wanner, Web Poster Exhibition- Shepard Fairey Posters for Barack
Obaina, RENE WANNER'S POSTER PAGE, http://www.posterpage.ch/exhib/ex2l6oba/
ex2l6oba.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2008) (same).
256. See, e.g., HOPE Mash-Ups (Communism & Socialism), FLICKR,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/51369494aNO2/sets/72157625184310806 (last visited May
6,2011).
257. See, e.g., HOPE Mash-Ups (Hitler), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@dNO2/sets/72157625059471043 (last visited May 6, 2011).
258. See, e.g., HOPE Mash-Ups (Che), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@dNO2/sets/72157625184317022 (last visited May 6,2011).
259. See, e.g., HOPE Mash-Ups (Messiah), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@dNO2/sets/72157625184277958 (last visited May 6, 2011).
260. See, e.g., HOPE Mash-Ups (Fraud), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@dNO2/sets/72157625059475737 (last visited May 6, 2011).
261. See, e.g., HOPE Mash-Ups (Snob), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@dNO2/sets/72157625059455385 (last visited May 6, 2011).
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many.262 These mash-ups evidence both individuals' attempts to nego-
tiate the meaning of the Fairey posters, and the struggle against the
author's attempt to control, transmit, and maintain meaning. Moreo-
ver, these images are themselves evidence of certain dominant social
conventions within the various interpretive communities from which
they emerged - only to be engaged, negotiated, and challenged once
again.
F. The Transformativeness Inquiry
The traditional transformativeness inquiry requires a comparison
of the protected work and the allegedly infringing work in a search for
evidence of authorship. In contrast, social semiotic theory focuses on
audience engagement with and about the work, as a social process in
which interpretive communities cultivate new cultural meanings, mes-
sages, and insights. Garcia's photograph- although protectable un-
der copyright - employs rather conventional, even common imagery.
This point is reinforced when one deconstructs the semiotic resources
represented in the photograph in the context of a U.S. presidential
campaign. Garcia's apparent intent (conscious or not) was to record
the event itself and to depict Obama as a traditional politician partici-
pating in a public event, drawing on elements familiar to that narra-
tive. Fairey's work retains the essence of these elements, but draws on
additional multitextual references, with the apparent intent of present-
ing Obama not only as a legitimate politician and presidential candi-
date, but as a certain type of candidate. In the situated social context
of Fairey's interpretive communities, particularly those allied with
post-modernist art, the aesthetic design elements of constructivism
and the Bauhaus school implicate positive interpretations. If Fairey's
use and transformation of those resources was motivated by his desire
to portray Obama as a young, hip, smart, and idealistic leader, this is
arguably the type of authorial activity intended to be protected under a
conventional fair use analysis.
Fairey's work does not, however, fit the dominant conception of
the romantic author and the ideology of originality.263 Fairey's debt to
prior works is not obscured. He does not claim originality of form as
much as a repurposing and recontextualization of content.264 Fairey
does not claim to critique the original work, per se, but rather to
262. Hundreds of these appropriated and repurposed images can be found online. See,
e.g., Mash-Ups (Soviet, Maoist, Fascist), FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
51369494@_NO2/sets/72157625059436075 (last visited May 6, 2011).
263. See supra note 118.
264. See Shepard Fairey, The AP, Obama, & Referencing, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(March 26, 2009, 12:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shepard-fairey/the-ap-obama-
referencing_b_179562.html (describing Fairey's technique as reference, appropriation, and
recontextualization).
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comment at a broad societal level.265 Finally, he does not claim con-
trol over the meaning of his work at a mass level, but instead aims his
work at a particular audience - what he describes as a "grassroots"
audience 266 - with shared semiotic codes. These "failings" of author-
ship might have jeopardized his transformativeness claim under a
conventional analysis.
In contrast, social semiotic theory looks to more than evidence of
authorial purpose, process, or activity. It supplements the question of
authorship, refraining the transformativeness analysis to focus on the
resulting work as a potential source of social value. Valuable new
expression - new meanings and new messages - created by social
interaction with the work can occur entirely apart from the author.
This social semiotic approach recognizes that the meaning of a text is
not controlled, transmitted, or even consistent across audiences. In-
stead, the sign-maker employs semiotic resources to create a text with
meaning potential based on past and possible uses of those resources.
The meaning potential of semiotic resources is only realized, how-
ever, when active, socially-situated audiences engage the work in a
discourse involving culturally-shared codes. Meaning-making is thus
a process of social interaction and response. When audience engage-
ment with a work (here, Fairey's posters) promotes divergent and un-
expected social responses in the form of discourse around that work
there is the potential for significant social value in the promotion of
new meanings or messages. Where that discourse is distinct from the
discourse surrounding the prior work (here, Garcia's photo), the new
work is transformative.
Under this framework, Fairey's work is highly transformative.
The semiotic resources employed by Fairey in his creation of the
Obama image proved to be more powerful and more ambiguous than
he likely imagined, engaging multiple and distinct semiotic regimes,
and producing multiple meanings from the same text. There is no evi-
dence that Garcia's photo produced discourse or meaning beyond that
intended by The AP - that is, recording and conveying a junior sena-
tor's appearance at a public event. The evidence of meaning-making
around the Fairey image is vast by comparison. Indeed, the various
mash-ups of the Fairey posters, produced by interpretive communities
with distinct systems of semiotic codes, are a testament to the con-
tested nature of the semiotic resources employed. In essence, Fairey's
inability to control the meaning of his work, and his inability to have
audiences choose the potential meaning he intended, ultimately sup-
port a finding of fair use.
265. See id. (describing the use of a "reference as a part of social commentary").
266. See id.; Complaint, supra note 1, at 5-6 (describing the perceived connection with
inspired "grassroots" voters).
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Unlike conventional transformativeness analysis, the goal of the
approach described here is not to reward or economically incentivize
the creation of distinctive works; rather, the semiotic fair use analysis
prioritizes the accommodation of expression around the protected
work. In this view, the fair use inquiry should not be a rivalry of in-
centivized authors. The social semiotic analysis allows us to move
away from competing authorial claims and conceptions of purpose,
and to focus instead on audience engagement with the work in a proc-
ess of meaning-making that may, in some cases, produce the very type
of new expression sought to be accommodated under fair use.
Under this approach, moreover, Fairey's own purpose in creating
the work and his success in doing so are relatively immaterial consid-
erations. What matters is how various interpretive communities en-
gage the work to produce new expression. As applied to works of
appropriation art, such as Fairey's, this shift from intent to result may
help to defuse the moral and ethical suspicion that seems to follow the
act of borrowing or recycling existing texts to create new works.
If copyright law fails to accommodate this semiotic struggle to
make meaning around the Fairey posters - to provide breathing
space for this process among restrictive intellectual property rights -
then the First Amendment values that ground the fair use defense are
diminished. Fairey's work cultivated dialogue, encouraging the flow
of information. It stimulated discourse among diverse communities,
both at the center and at the margins of social power. It served "the
public interest in airing divergent points of view."267 Fairey's work, in
other words, had a transformative effect in the form of new expression
through multiple meanings and messages.
IV. SOCIAL SEMIOTICS AND THE REMAINING FAIR USE
FACTORS
Section 107 of the Copyright Statute identifies four primary fac-
tors to be considered in the fair use analysis, the first of which is the
nature and character of defendant's use, including whether that use
was transformative.268 The remaining factors include the nature of the
copyrighted work (the second factor), the amount and substantiality of
the portion used (the third factor), and the effect of that use on the
potential market for, or value of, the original work (the fourth fac-
tor).269 This Part explores these remaining factors from a social semi-
otic perspective to determine if this theory provides any insight into
how they might be applied.
267. Samuelson, supra note 82, at 2565-66.
268. See supra Part I.B.
269. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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A. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second fair use factor "calls for recognition that some works
are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others,
with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when
the former works are copied." 270 In practice, this is often presented as
a dichotomy between works that are primarily creative, and thus
closer to the core of protection, and works that are primarily factual,
and thus further from the core.271 Works may contain both creative
and factual elements, with the proportion affecting the weight given
this factor.272 Courts seldom engage in an intensive analysis on this
point,273 although it may in some cases carry particular signifi-
cance.274 Commentators have noted that, while the distinction be-
tween factual and creative elements may be more apparent in certain
classes of works, others are more difficult to classify. Robert Kasunic
has made this point in regard to literary and visual works:
[A] photograph or pictorial work may be assumed to
be purely creative. But some pictorial works are pri-
marily factual. Consider a photograph of the Mai Lai
massacre or the Sandinista 1979 uprising. While
there may certainly have been selection, coordina-
tion, and arrangement involved, the subject matter of
these works is unquestionably factual. . . . An im-
pressionistic photograph of a factual event would be
more creative, whereas a photographic manipulation
of light and color might be viewed as purely creative.
The analysis must be based on the facts; but it is im-
portant to understand that there is a spectrum be-
tween fact and creative expression for many types of
works other than literary works, and potentially rele-
vant distinctions should be made when analyzing the
nature of the work.275
As this suggests, the distinction between factual and creative works is
closely tied to the concept of original authorship and eligibility for
270. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
271. See Robert Kasunic, Is That All There Is? Reflections on the Nature of the Second
Fair Use Factor, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 529, 544 (2008).
272. See PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 4:1.
273. SeeKasunic, supra note 271, at 544.
274. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-65
(1985) (focusing on The Nation's use not only of the factual aspects of the work, but chiefly
the "expressive elements of the work").
275. Kasunic, supra note 271, at 554 (footnote omitted).
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copyright protection.276 Thus, there is a tendency to view the question
as binary (either protectable or unprotectable). In the context of fair
use, however, the distinction allows for a more nuanced characteriza-
tion.
Social semiotics is potentially useful in this regard. Semiotic re-
sources are at the heart of the meaning-making process. Those
"[s]emiotic resources have a meaning potential, based on their past
uses, and a set of affordances based on their possible uses.""m The
sign-maker is motivated to draw upon this potential by transforming
existing semiotic resources in an attempt to produce a particular
meaning and effect.278 From this perspective, creativity is found not in
the constituent elements of the text but in their context, combination,
and similar factors - almost as one would view a compilation work
under copyright law.279 Attempts to dissect the various elements of a
work as proof of creativity are therefore suspect as divorced from the
text.
The Fairey case presents an interesting example of this idea. Gar-
cia's photograph employs semiotic resources with powerful encoded
meanings, tightly constrained by social convention: close proximity,
upward angle, elevated chin, sideways gaze into the distance, and pa-
triotic symbolism.280 These encoded meanings are reinforced by Gar-
cia's use and transformation of these semiotic resources. It is a classic
portrait pose used in depicting politicians. Garcia has done nothing to
recontextualize the semiotic resources, nor has he altered the social
context in which the audience encounters and engages the text: the
image is suitable for use in newspapers, accompanying a report about
a junior senator at an event.
Fairey argued that, looking at the work in its entirety, "[tihe Gar-
cia Photograph . .. is a factual, not fictional or highly creative, work,"
relying primarily on The AP's purpose in creating the work to docu-
ment an event. The AP responded by invoking Garcia's "distinc-
tive . . . creative and artistic input," as embodied in various aspects of
the photo-making process - "including (1) his deliberate selection of
a specific moment in time to capture President Obama's expression;
(2) his choice in using a particular type of lens and light for optimal
impact; and (3) his careful and unique composition of the photo-
276. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("To qual-
ify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity." (citations omitted)).
277. VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 147, at 285.
278. See KRESS & VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 161, at 7.
279. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2011).
280. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
281. Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
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graph." 282 The social semiotic analysis sharply recasts this evidence of
"creative and artistic input"283: Garcia's efforts are more accurately
described as an attempt to capture unremarkable semiotic resources
with powerful encoded meanings, to combine those resources and
present the text in an unremarkable way, and to do so for purposes of
conveying conventional meanings. From this perspective, there is lit-
tle creativity in either the Garcia photo or its constituent elements.
There is labor, but with minimal originality.
B. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third fair use factor addresses the proportion of the plaintiff s
work used by the defendant, both quantitatively and qualitatively.284
This "factor favors copyright holders where the portion used by the
alleged infringer is a significant percentage of the copyrighted work,
or where the portion used is essentially the heart of the copyrighted
work." 285 Applying this standard in Harper & Row, for example, the
Court found that the defendant had taken the heart of the plaintiffs
work by copying "dramatic focal points" of great "expressive value,"
which played a "key role in the infringing work."286 This application
suggests a certain connection between the second factor and the third
factor, with more creative aspects of the text tending toward the heart
of the work. 287
282. Answer, supra note 175, at 12 13 ("These facts, combined with Mr. Garcia's expe-
rience, skill and judgment, resulted in the creation of a distinctive image of a unique nm-
ment and expression of President Obama."); see also id. at 25 (describing the unique
characteristics of the Garcia photo and the associated artistic choices); id. at 26 (quoting
interview with Garcia describing the process of taking the photo); id. at 20 (describing the
various artistic decisions associated with photography).
283. Id. at 12.
284. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 587-88 (1994) ("[T]his factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the mat-
rials used, but about their quality and importance, too.").
285. Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quot-
ing NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2004)).
286. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). But see
PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 5:1 (collecting cases in which courts have "rejected
fair use claims when defendant copied a small but qualitatively important part, including the
'heart of the work."' (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65)).
287. Although Campbell draws a potential correlative connection between factor three
and factors one and four, no such connection is expressly drawn with the second factor:
[W]hether "a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied
verbatim" from the copyrighted work is a relevant question, for it
may reveal a dearth of transformative character or purpose under the
first factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm under the fourth; a
work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with
little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use,
fulfilling demand for the original.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587 88 (citation omitted) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565).
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From a social semiotic perspective, this analysis implicates simi-
lar concerns about Garcia's choice and use of semiotic resources. The
AP argued that Fairey selected Garcia's "distinctive image" as a ref-
erence because of its "unique qualities," 288 but it is equally likely that
Fairey chose Garcia's image because of its almost generic nature and
powerful encoded messages. The photo is essentially a compilation of
semiotic resources with strictly limited meaning potential, the power
of which is reinforced by standard transformation and contextualiza-
289tion. It is difficult, then, to characterize the text itself as having sig-
nificant expressive value beyond that of the dominant social
conventions constraining the semiotic resources employed. The work
has little "heart" for Fairey to take.
C. Effect on Actual and Potential Markets
The fourth factor of the fair use inquiry is "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."290
This factor "requires courts to consider not only the extent of market
harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also
'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in
by the defendant . .. would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market' for the original."291 This includes both harm to
the original and harm to the market for derivative works.292
The market harm analysis recognizes that true market substitutes
"cause[] the greatest harm to copyright owners," 293 whether the copy
288. See Answer, supra note 175, at 12-13.
289. See supra Part III.C.3.f
290. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
291. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (1994) (omission in original) (quoting MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1993)); see also Brandon
Grzandziel, A New Argument for Fair Use Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 16
U. MIAMIBUS. L. REv. 171, 195 (2008) ("Camnpbell's formulation imposes a higher burden
of proof on the party alleging infringement. Because of this 'substantially' higher burden,
Campbell effectively enlarges the scope of fair use by giving to those claiming it more room
to act before they 'substantially' affect the market.").
292. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
293. Sara K. Stadler, Relevant Markets for Copyrighted Works, 34 J. CORP. L. 1059,
1059 60 (2009). Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998), structures
the market harm analysis into three categories: (1) impairment of marketability; (2) market
substitution; and (3) derivative or potential markets. Id. at 206-07. In Sundeman, impair-
ment of marketability focuses on the effect of defendant's limited use on the value of or
potential markets for an unpublished work. See id. Market substitution considers the ques-
tion of transformativeness and implicates the distinction between adverse market effects
arising from various forms of republication (substitution) and those resulting from criticism
(suppression). See id. at 207. The derivative or potential market analysis again focuses on
substitution, but is limited to market harms in "uses that the copyright holder of the original
work would [potentially] develop or license others to develop." Id. at 207; see also Mattel,
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering plain-
tiffs argument that defendant's work could lead to market harm by impairing the value of
the original work, derivatives of that work, and/or licensing of the work or its derivatives).
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serves as a substitute for the original work or a derivative work.294
However, just as transformativeness exists on a spectrum, so too does
market substitution and the resulting market harm.295 Determining the
degree of substitutive effect requires a comparative examination of the
copyright holder's actual or potential markets and markets for a de-
fendant's work. At one extreme are works that are mere duplicates of
the copyrighted work and are created for commercial purposes. In
such cases, substitutive effect and the resulting market harm are pre-
sumed.296 At the other extreme are parodies and other critical works
that comment on the copyrighted work, for which "the law recognizes
no derivative market" 297 and thus no cognizable harm in substitution.
This final point turns on the distinction between usurpation of
market demand and suppression of market demand. Generally speak-
ing, usurpation resulting from the availability of market substitutes is
a cognizable harm under copyright law,298 whereas suppression result-
ing from criticism or comparison is not.299 Outside of this precise dis-
tinction between market usurpation and market suppression, however,
the question of market substitution becomes more nuanced, unstruc-
tured, and unpredictable. This middle ground tends to be described in
terms of the allegedly infringing work rather than the markets for the
original, inviting an analysis of transformativeness as a matter of de-
gree. For instance, Sara Stadler describes cases "involving accused
works that exist in significant part to enable new uses.... [where] the
defendant has taken something from the plaintiff, added something,
and given the copyrighted expression (which emerges largely intact) a
different purpose than the one served by the original."300 Likewise,
Christina Bohannan describes cases in which "the defendant might
But see PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 3:10 (noting that "[r]egrettably," the proper
purposes and goals of fair use analysis are "occasionally lost in favor of economic tests
centering around the presence ofan ill-defined concept of 'market failure').
294. See Stadler, supra note 293, at 1066 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985), and Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d. 512 (7th
Citr. 2002)).
295. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n.21.
296. It should be noted that mere duplication is not per se harmful. "[N]ot all harm to the
market caused by unauthorized uses may be weighed under the fourth factor (or, indeed,
considered at all)." PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 6:6. For instance, some material
from the original may be unprotectable, or the use of protected material de minimis. Id; see
also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991) (holding that
the "names, towns, and telephone numbers" in the white pages were "not original to [plain-
tiff] and therefore were not protected by [its] copyright," and thus defendant's "use of the
listings [did not] constitute infringement").
297. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
298. See PATRY ON FAIR USE, supra note 16, § 6:6 ("It is only harm arising from the abil-
ity of defendant's use to act as a substitute for plaintiffs work in the marketplace that may
disqualify one from successfully asserting fair use.").
299. See id. ("Indirect harm caused to the value of the work by criticism or comment
may . . . be eliminated from consideration.").
300. Stadler, supra note 293, at 1073.
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copy less from the copyrighted work, add to or transform the work, or
exploit the work in markets that are more remote from the copyright
owner's foreseeable markets."3 01
Social semiotics may provide some insight into this question of
market differentiation by distinguishing markets based on audience
engagement. The Fairey case presents an interesting illustration of
both the promise and the limitations of this approach. Direct markets
for the Garcia photo include The AP itself, newspapers, and other me-
dia outlets. The direct market for Fairey's work would likely include
art collectors and Obama supporters. The AP might argue that Obama
supporters are a potential market for the Garcia photo, but there ap-
pears to be limited evidence to support that assertion. The more diffi-
cult issue is what might be called indirect markets, where The AP
licenses an image to third-party producers of "advertising, artistic
works and merchandise, including . .. tote bags, T-shirts, posters,
prints, banners and the like." 302 The AP vehemently argues that its
"long-established licensing program . . .. is fundamental to The AP's
existence."3 0 3 According to The AP, "[Fairey's] unauthorized use of
the Obama Photo has caused substantial impairment to the potential
market for the original photo, namely, The AP's ability to license its
use." 304
If an ex ante foreseeability standard is applied to limit the appar-
ent circularity of the potential licensing argument, social semiotics
may be useful in differentiating among relevant markets. In terms of
plaintiffs work, social conventions and culturally-shared codes could
help identify those interpretive communities reasonably likely to en-
gage the work in the process of meaning-making. These can be seen
as foreseeable markets. When the flow of discourse around the subse-
quent work moves significantly outside these dominant structures and
301. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U.
L. REv. 969, 1019 (2007).
302. Answer, supra note 175, at 24.
303. Id. at 14. The AP argued that
The talent, skill and effort required to create compelling still images
has fostered a vibrant market for professional photography, one on
which many photographers have come to rely for their livelihoods. In
addition, many content providers, whether news or entertainment in
nature, rely on this revenue to support their activities. The AP's li-
censing program not only allows it to continue operating its full scale,
robust and dependable newsgathering services worldwide, but it en-
ables The AP to pursue efforts protecting the First Amendment and
guaranteeing public access to open government on the local, state and
federal levels.
Id. at 24.
304. Id. at 39. Fairey asserted that his use of the photo "imposed no significant or cogni-
zable harm to the value of the Garcia Photograph or any market for it or any derivatives."
Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
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constraints, these markets are less foreseeable. In the latter instance,
substitutive market harm carries less weight.
The Fairey case raises two questions in this regard. The first is
whether Fairey's deliberate transformation of an almost generic or
iconic image into a stylized expression of inspirational "difference,"
and distribution of the new work thus created, represented a foresee-
able market for the Garcia photo. The second is whether the unex-
pected cultural flows that developed around the Fairey posters - in
terms of mash-ups of the posters themselves, mash-ups of other
propaganda posters, and the fervent political and cultural dialog sur-
rounding these images - constitute foreseeable (or even possible)
markets for Garcia's photo. Remembering that substitutive market
harm exists on a scale, rather than as an either/or, the question is not
whether Fairey could have licensed the photo but rather the likelihood
of a substantial effect on these potential markets. Part of that question
is the likelihood that these licensing markets, as well as the markets
that emerged because of Fairey's use, would have ever existed. Given
the power relations embedded in expressive communications, that is
highly unlikely in this case. As this example suggests, social semiotic
theory can in some cases be useful in distinguishing those markets
that were foreseeable at the time of creation and/or distribution from
those entirely speculative markets that nevertheless later develop.
It should be cautioned, however, that an analysis of substitutive
market harm can rather easily become focused on the transformative
nature of defendant's work, rather than the markets themselves. This
tendency can be traced back to Campbell. There the Court drew a dis-
tinction between mere duplication and transformative works, noting
that while a presumption of market harm may be proper as regards the
former, no such presumption was proper for transformative works.305
This distinction was based on the inherently substitutive nature of
verbatim copies, which the Court found strong enough to justify a
limited evidentiary presumption. o0 The Court also recognized that
transformative works are less likely to serve as market substitutes. 07
305. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
306. See id.
307. See id.; see also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,1274 n.28
(11th Cir. 2001). It should be noted, however, that a significant number of courts have dis-
torted this correlative observation, asserting instead that transformativeness is a primary
factor in the market effect analysis. See, e.g., A.V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,
562 F.3d 630, 643 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that "regardless of whether the defendant used the
original work to critique or parody it, the transformative nature of the use is relevant to the
market effect factor"); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1274 n.28 ("Whereas a work that merely
supplants or supersedes another is likely to cause a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market of the original, a transformative work is less likely to do so." (quoting Sony
Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2000)); On Davis v.
Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (asserting that "market effect must be evaluated
in light of whether the secondary use is transformative").
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In this context, applying social semiotic theory both to the trans-
formativeness inquiry and the question of market harm potentially
increases the risk of either subsuming the transformativeness inquiry
or, on the other end of the spectrum, double-counting the transforma-
tive nature of the subsequent work. Both results should be avoided.
Certainly, transformative works are less likely to serve as a market
substitute for the original, but this merely restates the observed in-
verse correlation between transformativeness and market harm, and
should thus not constitute an operative factor in the market harm
analysis. It is important, therefore, to maintain the distinction between
social semiotics as an analytical tool in the transformativeness inquiry
and social semiotics as a means of market definition in an analysis of
market harm.
V. CONCLUSION
Supplementing traditional fair use analysis with a social semiotic
approach to fair use serves copyright's goal of expanding the body of
new expression by accommodating meaning-making processes that
occur as various interpretive communities engage a particular text. By
focusing on the text, rather than focusing exclusively on authorial
purpose and activity, the social semiotic approach avoids the rivalry
of authors that plagues the fair use analysis. It is also consistent with
modem understandings of authorship and originality, but without dis-
placing the accommodation of more traditionally evidenced author-
ship.
The social semiotic approach acknowledges that new and differ-
ent meanings - often multiple meanings - may be realized in the
social life of a text, rather than solely in the mind of an author. Social
semiotic theory offers an analytical methodology by which to identify
those works that, when encountered by an audience, move signifi-
cantly beyond author intention by engaging distinct social conven-
tions and semiotic regimes. Where this discourse and the multiple
meanings produced through that process of meaning-making coalesce
around a subsequent work rather than the original work, transforma-
tiveness is shown.
Social semiotic analysis is particularly well adapted to the chal-
lenges of certain postmodern artistic practices, such as appropriation
and the user-generated content that is the hallmark of our remix cul-
ture, both of which utilize and retain the core of cultural elements pm-
tected under copyright law. The transformative nature of the
subsequent work is evidenced, not by dissecting elements of inspired
authorship, but by the artifacts of audience engagement and meaning-
making that add to the body of new expression. An infringement de-
fendant claiming this form of transformativeness would therefore
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need to produce evidence of audience engagement and the negotiation
of new and distinct meanings around the text. In Fairey v. Associated
Press, for example, this evidence would include both vibrant discus-
sion of the work and the many mash-ups produced by Obama sup-
porters and detractors alike. The social semiotic analysis benefits from
a networked environment in which active discourse around a work is
both facilitated and preserved, and the social value of that expressive
process is more readily apparent. The evidence of transformativeness
is all around us.

